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INTRODUCTION
A  central tenet of American foreign relations law is that customary
Z  international law ("CIL") has the domestic legal status of federal
common  law.  In  a  recent article, we  labeled  this view  the  "modern
position."1  We  argued  that the  modem  position  rose  to orthodoxy
only recently and that it is inconsistent  with basic understandings  re-
garding  American  representative  democracy,  federal  common  law,
separation  of  powers,  and  federalism.  We  concluded  that  courts
should not apply CIL as federal law unless authorized to do so by the
federal political  branches.
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1.  See Curtis A. Bradley  & Jack L. Goldsmith,  Customar,  International  Law as
Federal Common Law: A  Critique  of the Modern Position,  110 Harv. L Rev. 815, 816
(1997).FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
The principal significance of the modern position concerns the legit-
imacy  of international  human rights litigation in U.S. courts.2  In  re-
cent  years,  U.S.  courts  have  been  faced  with  a  growing  number  of
cases involving alleged human rights abuses in foreign countries.3  The
authority  of U.S. courts  to hear  and provide  relief in such  cases has
largely been premised on the validity of the modern position.  Never-
theless,  there  may  be  theories  other than  the  modern  position  that
would support  such litigation.4  Our earlier work only briefly  touched
on  these  alternate  theories;  we  consider  them  more fully  here.  We
also respond  to criticisms  of  our earlier work  made  in  this issue  by
fellow panelists  Gerald Neuman, Beth Stephens, and Ryan Goodman
and Derek Jinks.5
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I briefly summarizes  our
thesis  and  explains  why  the  legitimacy  of human  rights  litigation  is
what  is  really at  stake in  debates  over the  modern position.  Part  II
responds  to  criticisms  of  certain  of  our  historical  and  constitutional
claims.  Part  III considers  whether  the judicial  treatment  of interna-
tional human  rights law  as  federal  law  can  plausibly  be justified,  in-
dependent of the modem position, by the Alien Tort Statute and  the
Torture Victim Protection Act.  We conclude that it cannot.  The fed-
eral political branches can authorize international human rights litiga-
tion if they wish.  But with narrow exceptions, they have not done so
thus far.  Until they do, international human rights litigation rests on a
tenuous  legal foundation.
I.  A CRITIQUE  OF THE  MODERN  POSITION
A.  Summary
The two  principal  sources  of  public international  law  are  treaties
and CIL.  Treaties are express agreements among nations.6  CIL  is the
law  of the  international  community  that "results  from  a general  and
consistent practice  of states followed  by them from  a  sense  of  legal
obligation."7  Both forms of international law impose binding obliga-
tions on  nations  on  the international  plane.  International  law, how-
2.  See id. at  818-19,  821,  832-34,  869-70.
3.  See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Marcos
Human  Rights Litigation,  978  F.2d  493  (9th  Cir.  1992); Xuncax  v.  Gramajo, 886  F.
Supp. 162  (D. Mass.  1995).
4.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith,  supra note 1, at  872-73.
5.  See Gerald  L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International
Law:  A  Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66  Fordham  L. Rev.  371
(1997);  Beth Stephens,  The Law of Our Land: Customary International  Law as Fed-
eral Law After Erie,  66 Fordham  L. Rev. 393  (1997)  [hereinafter Stephens,  The Law
of Our Land]; Ryan Goodman  & Derek P. Jinks,  Filartiga's Firm Footing: Interna-
tional Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 Fordham  L. Rev. 463  (1997).
6.  See Restatement  (Third)  of the Foreign Relations  Law  of the  United  States,
pt. I,  introductory note, at 18  (1987)  [hereinafter  Restatement  (Third)].
7.  Restatement  (Third), supra note  6,  § 102(2),  at 24.
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ever, does not itself specify  how nations  must treat these  obligations
as  a matter  of domestic  law.8  Instead,  the  domestic  legal  status  of
international  law is  determined  by each  nation's  domestic law.
The U.S.  Constitution  states in Article  VI  that  treaties  are  part  of
the "supreme Law of the Land,"9  and in Article III  that cases arising
under treaties fall within the judicial power of the federal courts.',  By
contrast, neither of these articles mentions  CIL, which  at the  time  of
the founding was referred to as part of the "law of nations.""  More-
over, as Professor Henkin has noted, the language  of the Supremacy
Clause "does  not easily include [customary] international  law."' 2  The
Constitution's only express reference to CIL is in Article  I, which pro-
vides that Congress  has the power to "define  and punish...  [o]ffenses
against the Law of Nations."' 3
Despite this contrast between the Constitution's  treatment of trea-
ties and  its treatment of CIL, proponents of the modern  position ar-
gue that  CIL, like treaties, has  the status  of federal  law.  It  has  this
status, the argument goes, by virtue of the common law powers of the
federal courts.  Under this view, U.S.  courts are to apply  CIL as  fed-
eral law  even in the absence  of authorization  by  the federal political
branches.
14
8.  See Louis Henkin  et  al.,  International  Law:  Cases and  Materials  153  (3d  ed.
1993)  [hereinafter  Henkin,  International  Law].  Accordingly,  nations  "differ  as  to
whether international law is incorporated  into domestic law and ...  whether the exec-
utive or the courts will give effect to norms of international law or to treaty provisions
in the absence of their implementation  by domestic legislation."  Id.
9.  See  U.S. Const.  art. VI,  cl.  2 ("[A]I  Treaties  made, or which  shall  be  made,
under  the Authority  of the United  States, shall  be  the  supreme  Law  of  the  Land
10.  See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.  1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall  be made, under their Authority  .... ").
11.  See Edwin  D. Dickinson,  The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of
the United States, 101  U. Pa.  L. Rev. 26, 26-27  (1952);  Stewart  Jay, The Status of the
Law of Nations  in Early American Law, 42 Vand.  L  Rev. 819, 821-22 (1989)  [herein-
after Jay,  The Status of the Law of Nations].
12.  Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 508 n.16 (2d
ed.  1996)  [hereinafter  Henkin,  Foreign  Affairs].  The  Supremacy  Clause  defines
supreme federal law to include the Constitution, treaties, and "the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance"  of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2
(emphasis added).  CIL is not the Constitution or a treaty, and it is not made pursuant
to U.S. constitutional  processes; rather, it is made by the world community "in  a pro-
cess  to which the United  States contributes  only in an uncertain  way and  to an inde-
terminate  degree."  Henkin, Foreign  Affairs, supra, at  508 n.16.
13.  U.S. Const. art. I,  § 8, cl.  10.
14.  See,  e.g.,  Filartiga  v.  Pena-Irala,  630  F.2d  876,  887  n.20  (2d  Cir.  1980)
("[Ijnternational  law  has  an existence  in  the  federal  courts  independent  of acts  of
Congress."); United  States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp. 1291,  1297  (S.D.N.Y.  1988)  ("Inter-
national law exists in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress  ...  ."); Louis
Henkin, International  Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich.  L  Rev.  1555,  1561
(1984)  [hereinafter Henkin, International  Law as Law] ("International  law ...  is'self-
executing' and is applied by courts in  the United States without  any need for it  to be
enacted or implemented  by Congress.").
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At this  level  of generality,  numerous  courts and  commentators  in
recent years have  endorsed  the modem  position. 5  Courts, however,
have generally endorsed it only in connection with their consideration
of whether  CIL  is part  of the  "Laws  of the  United  States"  for pur-
poses of Article  III "arising  under" jurisdiction,  and related jurisdic-
tional  questions.' 6  Commentators,  on  the  other  hand,  have  more
broadly considered  the consequences that the modern position might
have for domestic lawmaking institutions and other forms of domestic
law.' 7  Many commentators plausibly argue that if CIL is federal com-
mon law, it preempts inconsistent state law pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause.' 8  Others  plausibly  argue  that if the  modern  position  is  cor-
rect, then judicial interpretations  of CIL bind the President under the
"Take  Care"  Clause of Article II of the  Constitution.' 9  Some propo-
15.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at 817  nn.3-4, 837  nn.150-51  (collect-
ing numerous sources  which support this view  of CIL).
16.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 501-03
(9th  Cir. 1992); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,  885-89  (2d Cir. 1980); Xuncax  v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.  162,  193-94  (D. Mass. 1995).
17.  Neuman dismisses many of these consequences as "speculative variants on the
modern position offered by particular scholars."  Neuman, supra note 5,  at 380-81.  We
acquiesce  in Neuman's  efforts to  de-legitimate some of the broader consequences  of
the  modern  position,  which  have  been  advocated  by  Professors  Glennon,  Henkin,
Lobel,  Paust, and  others.  His  claim, however, that our description  of these  broader
consequences  involves  "errors  of commission  and  omission"  because  not all  propo-
nents of the modern position subscribe to such consequences, see Neuman, supra note
5, at 380, is off the mark.  We made clear in our earlier work that there was  no canoni-
cal account  of the basis  for or consequences  of the modem  position, see Bradley  &
Goldsmith, supra note  1, at 816 n.2; we emphasized  that the implications of the mod-
ern position "are being developed (and  urged on courts) primarily by scholars,"  id. at
838;  and  we  were  careful  to flag  instances  in  which scholars  disagreed  about  these
implications, see id. at  844  (noting  that "[n]ot  all  supporters  of the  modern position
agree  with  Professor Henkin"  that  CIL trumps prior inconsistent  federal  statutes),
and  id. at 845 (noting that the view that CIL binds the President is "far from univer-
sally accepted").  Because we  lack Neuman's  ability  to discern  which  commentators
are "mainstream"  and which are not, see Neuman, supra  note 5,  at 381,  our goal was
simply to show that all of the potential consequences  of the modern position  for do-
mestic lawmaking-whatever  their other demerits-depend  on  the  view that  CIL is
federal  law. See  Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at  844,  846.  Neuman's  confi-
dence in a relatively narrow variant  of the modern position, and his dismissal of other
variants,  is therefore best addressed  to supporters of the modern position, not to us.
18.  See,  e.g.,  Restatement  (Third),  supra note  6,  §§ 111(1),  115  cmt.  e;  Lea
Brilmayer,  Federalism, State Authority, and the  Preemptive Power of International
Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 303; Henkin, International  Law as Law, supra note  14, at
1561.
19.  See,  e.g.,  Michael  J. Glennon,  Raising The Paquete  Habana:  Is Violation of
Customary International  Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?,  80 Nw.  U.  L. Rev.
321, 348-58  (1985)  [hereinafter  Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana]; Jules Lobel,
The  Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between  Foreign Policy and Interna-
tional Law,  71  Va.  L. Rev.  1071,  1116-20  (1985);  Jordan  J.  Paust,  The President Is
Bound by Customary International  Law, 81  Am. J. Int'l L. 377, 382 (1987)  [hereinafter
Paust, The President  Is Bound]; cf Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Federal Statutes, Executive
Orders and "Self-Executing Custom", 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 371, 374-75 (1987)  (concluding
that the Executive  has the power to violate CIL only in  certain circumstances);  Louis1997]  HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS  & U.S. LAW  323
nents of the modem position even argue that CIL supersedes inconsis-
tent federal  legislation.'
Our  critique  of  the  modem  position  began  with  history.  Many
courts  and commentators  rest their  support  for the modem  position
on nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  century judicial  decisions  that re-
ferred to CIL-or the "law  of nations"-as  "part  of our  law" or the
"law  of the  land."'"  The court in  the seminal  Filartiga  decision,  for
example, cited  these decisions  for  the proposition  that  CIL "has  al-
ways  been  part of the  federal  common  law."'  These  decisions  did
not, however, apply CIL as federal law.  Rather, they applied it as part
of the "general  common  law"  famously  associated  with  Swift  v.  Ty-
son.23  Courts applied general common law as a default in the absence
of any particular domestic authorization  unless and  until state or fed-
eral legislation specified otherwise.24  Unlike modem federal common
law, general common law did not have the status of federal  law. 5  As
a result, CIL, as a form of general common law, did not bind the states
Henkin, The President  and International Law, 80  Am. J. Int'l  L  930,  935-36  (1986)
[hereinafter  Henkin,  The President] (same).
20.  Professor Henkin  has argued that  CIL supersedes  prior, but not subsequent,
inconsistent federal legislation.  See Louis Henkin,  The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A  Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 Harv. L  Rev. 853,
875 (1987)  [hereinafter Henkin, Tire Constitution and United States Sovereignty].  Pro-
fessor Paust has  gone further, arguing  that  some CIL  rules have  the  status of U.S.
constitutional  law, and therefore  supersede even  subsequent  federal  legislation.  See
Jordan J. Paust, International  Law as Law of the United States 5-6, 95, 338-43 (1996)
[hereinafter Paust, International  Law].  Another possible role  for international  law is
in the interpretation  of federal enactments.  For a discussion of that role, see Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming  Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Inter-
pretive Role of International  Law, 86 Geo. L.J. __ (forthcoming) [hereinafter Bradley,
The Charming  Betsy Canon].
21.  See,  e.g.,  The Paquete Habana,  175  U.S.  677, 700 (1900)  ("part of our law");
The Nereide,  13  U.S. 388,  423  (1815)  ("law  of the  land"); see generally Bradley  &
Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 849  nn.217, 218 (listing courts and  commentators relying
on these precedents).
22.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,  630  F.2d 876,  885  (2d Cir. 1980).
23.  41 U.S. 1 (1842).  For evidence that CIL was treated as general  common law in
the nineteenth  century, see Bradley  &  Goldsmith, supra note  1, at  822-26;  see also
Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International  Law in U.S.  Courts-Before
and After Erie, 25 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y - (forthcoming) [hereinafter Bradley, The
Status of Customary International  Law] (citing additional authority).  Ve use the term
"general common law" to refer to the body of non-federal common law applied  inde-
pendently by state and federal courts before Erie. This law was sometimes referred  to
by courts as the "common  law" or the "general  law." See Bradley, Tire Status of Cus-
tomary International  Law, supra.
24.  See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:  A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245,  1276-87  (1996);  William A. Fletcher, Tire General Common
Law and Section 34 of  the Judiciary  Act of  1789: Tie Example of Marine lisurance,  97
Harv.  L. Rev. 1513,  1515,  1517-21  (1984);  Stewart  Jay,  Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part  Two, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1263-79 (1985)  [hereinafter Jay, Tire Origins];
Lawrence  Lessig,  Erie-Effects of Volume  110:  An  Essay on  Contert in Interpretive
Theory, 110  Harv. L. Rev.  1785,  1790-92  (1997).
25.  See Fletcher, supra note  24, at 1524-27.FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
under the Supremacy  Clause,26 did  not bind  the President under  the
Take Care  Clause, 7 and did not establish  a basis for federal question
jurisdiction. 8
At least  until the  time  of Erie Railroad v.  Tompkins, 9  then, CIL
was viewed  as  non-federal general common  law in the  absence of its
incorporation into federal law by the political branches.  The Court in
Erie overruled  Swift,  announced  that  "[t]here  is no  federal  general
common  law,"  and  held  that,  "[e]xcept  in  matters  governed  by  the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case  is the law of the State."3  As we now know, Erie paved the
way for a new and genuinely federal common law.3'  To be consistent
with the requirements  of Erie, however, this new federal common law
must be authorized in some fashion by the U.S. Constitution or a fed-
eral statute.32  Such authorization  is what gives the new federal com-
mon law its status  as supreme  federal law.33
26.  See,  e.g.,  Charles  Pergler, Judicial  Interpretation  of International  Law  in  the
United States  19  (1928)  (noting in 1928 that if a state statute "violates  an established
principle of international  law..,  clearly there would be only one course open  to the
courts, viz., to enforce the state statute, always assuming its constitutionality and that
it does not contravene  any valid federal  enactment,  or any  treaty"); Quincy Wright,
The Control of American Foreign Relations  161  (1922)  (noting in  1922 that  a "state
constitution or legislative provision in violation of customary international law is valid
unless in conflict  with a Federal  constitutional provision  or an act  of Congress").
27.  See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)  (stating that courts are
to apply CIL "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive  or legislative  act
or judicial decision").
28.  With  regard  to  federal  question  jurisdiction  under  Article  III, see American
Ins. Co. v. Canter,  26 U.S. 511, 545-46 (1828)  (holding that a case involving application
of the "law,  admiralty and maritime"-elements  of the  law of nations-does "not in
fact, arise under the Constitution or Laws of the United States"  within the meaning of
Article III).  With regard  to statutory federal question jurisdiction, see Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436,  444 (1886)  (holding that "laws...  of the United States" in Section 25 of
Judiciary Act of 1789 does  not include  the law  of nations);  City and County of San
Francisco  v.  Scott, 111  U.S.  768,  769  (1884)  (same); and  New  York  Life  Ins. Co. v.
Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87  (1875)  (same).
29.  304 U.S. 64  (1938).
30. Id. at 78.
31.  See Henry J. Friendly,  In Praise of Erie-And of the New  Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405-07 (1964).  Stephens is right that there were pre-Erie
precursors  to a genuinely federal common law, but she is mistaken in suggesting  that
these pre-Erie precedents treated customary international law  as federal  law.  See in-
fra pp.  333-34.
32.  See Martha  Field, Sources of Law:  The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 883,  895-96  (1986); Friendly, supra note 31,  at 407, 421; Larry Kramer,
The Lawmaking Power of the Federal  Courts,  12 Pace  L. Rev. 263, 287  (1992); Thomas
W. Merrill,  The  Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52  U.  Chi.  L. Rev.  1, 17
(1985);  Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 889,  892 (1974)  (book  review);  George Rutherglen, Recon-
structing Erie:  A  Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 Const. Commentary
285,  294 (1993).  But see Louise  Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.  L. Rev.
805,  813 (1989)  ("Courts must act, of course, within their constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction.  But no  other 'authorization'  is required.").
33.  See Friendly, supra note 31,  at 407.
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Nothing on the face  of the Constitution  or any federal  statute  ap-
pears to authorize  the modern position's envisioned  wholesale  appli-
cation  of  CIL by  the  federal  judiciary.  As  noted  above,  Article  I
authorizes  Congress to define and  punish  offenses against  the law of
nations.'  Congress has  exercised this and related powers  to incorpo-
rate select  CIL  principles into federal statutes,3  but it has never pur-
ported  to incorporate  all  of  CIL into  federal  law.  And  Congress's
selective  incorporation  would  be largely superfluous  if  CIL were  al-
ready incorporated  wholesale  into federal common  law.
Some  commentators  have  argued  that  the  authorization  for  the
modern position comes not from the text but rather from the structure
of the Constitution.  They contend that the interpretation  and applica-
tion of CIL  falls within the exclusive foreign affairs powers of the fed-
eral government  and that it is therefore  a proper subject  for federal
common-lawmaking  by  the  federal  courts.  In  support  of  this  argu-
ment, they rely heavily on the Supreme Court's Sabbatino decision.'
In our prior work, we argued that, contrary to popular lore, Sabbatino
did not hold that CIL  was federal  law.37  We further argued  that  the
federal common law of foreign relations to which  Sabbatino  gave  rise
offers no support for the separation  of powers  claims  of the modern
position  and, at best,  only  weak support  for the federalism  claims.3"
Finally, we argued  that, independent  of Sabbatino, the  modern  posi-
tion's federalism  claims  are in  substantial  tension  with  the Supreme
Court's modern federalism jurisprudence,  as well  as with  various  ac-
tions by the federal political branches.39
B.  What is at Stake
Those uninitiated to the modern position debate might assume that
the debate  concerns  what has  traditionally  been  thought  of as inter-
national  law; that is, the law regulating  the relations  among nations.
This was in fact the focus of pre-World  War II  CIL, which  regulated,
for example, the treatment of diplomats and the use of military force.
This  traditional  CIL was  "authentically  customary  law-norms  that
have in fact resulted from practice."'   The state practice requirement
for the existence of CIL  was satisfied  by  a general,  uniform, and  usu-
ally longstanding  practice.4'  The other requirement for the existence
of CIL-the subjective  "sense  of  legal  obligation"  or opinio juris-
was largely induced  by examining the general  practice.
34.  See supra note  13.
35.  See Henkin,  Foreign Affairs, supra note 12,  at  508 n.16  (citing  examples).
36.  Banco Nacional  de Cuba v. Sabbatino,  376  U.S. 398 (1964).
37.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at 859-60.
38.  Id. at 860-67.
39.  Id. at 867-70.
40.  Louis Henkin,  International  Law:  Politics and  Values  33  (1995)  [hereinafter
Henkin, Politics  and Values].
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For several reasons, the modern position debate does not primarily
concern  this  traditional CIL.  First, the modem position  debate  con-
cems  the status  of  CIL  in  U.S.  courts,  whereas  much  of traditional
CIL is  only relevant to  international  diplomatic  relations  and never
arises  in  domestic  litigation.42  Second,  much  of the  traditional  CIL
that was  applied by courts  as general  common law  in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries  is no longer relevant to domestic litiga-
tion.43  Third,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  the  federal  political
branches have rendered much of the traditional CIL irrelevant for do-
mestic purposes  because  they have  federalized  this law  by treaty  or
statute.44  These  reasons help explain  why the  issue  of the  domestic
legal  status  of CIL rarely came  up in the decades  after  Erie. 45  They
also  explain  why the  enormous post-1980  literature  on the  domestic
status of CIL rarely if ever  speaks  to traditional  CIL.  It may still be
possible for an occasional  issue of uncodified  traditional  CIL to arise
in domestic litigation.  These situations will be rare, however, and they
are not the focus  of the modern position  debate.46
42.  See Restatement  (Third), supra note 6, § 111  cmt. c ("Much customary law and
many international agreements  ...  do not have the quality of law for the courts in that
they do not regulate activities, relations, or interests in the United States.");  Phillip R.
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International  Law, 33 UCLA  L. Rev. 665,
670 (1986)  [hereinafter Trimble, A Revisionist View]  ("In practice, customary interna-
tional law is applied primarily  by the political  branches, not the judiciary.").
43.  For example,  the CIL governing prize  law, which was  frequently  applied  by
courts  in  the  nineteenth  century,  had  largely  disappeared  by  1948.  See  David
Bederman, The Feigned  Demise of Prize,  9 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 31, 36-41  (1995)  (book
review)  (providing  various  reasons for  this  phenomenon,  such  as  the  fact  that  the
United  States has  not been in a declared  war since  1945,  and  the  legal  predicate  to
prize law  is that the capture occur  during war).  Similarly, the law  of piracy played  a
prominent role  in U.S.  courts in the nineteenth  century  but  plays a relatively  small
role today. See Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy 298, 337-46 (U.S. Naval War Col-
lege International  Law Studies, vol. 63,  1988).
44.  Thus, for example, foreign sovereign immunity is now the subject of a compre-
hensive  federal  statute,  the Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act,  28  U.S.C.  §§  1330,
1602-11 (1994),  and diplomatic immunity is the subject of treaties to which the United
States is a party. See, e.g., Vienna Convention  on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18,  1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227,  500 U.N.T.S. 95.
45.  The single post-Erie, pre-Sabbatino decision  to squarely address the domestic
legal status of CIL is Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).  In Bergman,
the court  sitting in  diversity considered  whether an ambassador  in transit  to another
country was  entitled under CIL to immunity from service of process.  Writing for  the
court, Judge  Learned  Hand  explained that "[the New  York state courts']  interpreta-
tion  of international  law is controlling  upon us,  and we are  to follow  them so far as
they have declared themselves."  Id. at 361.  After analyzing three New York  decisions
and a variety of international sources, Hand concluded  that "the  courts of New York
would today hold" that an ambassador in transit is immune under CIL from service of
process in New York. Id. at 363.  He added the caveat, however, that  "[w]hether  an
avowed  refusal  to accept  a well-established  doctrine of international law,  or a plain
misapprehension  of it,  would present  a  federal  question  we  need  not consider,  for
neither is present here." Id. at 361.  Today this issue of diplomatic immunity would be
governed  by treaty.
46.  See infra part  II for further  discussion  of this point.1997]  HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS  &  U.S. LAW  327
The focus of the modem position debate is rather on what we have
called the "new CIL." 47  This new CIL can best be understood against
the backdrop  of the larger transformation  of international  law gener-
ally in the post-World War II period.  Since the War, international  law
has developed  to regulate  to some extent  the ways in which  nations
treat their citizens.'  The principal sources of this change have been a
series of multilateral  human rights  treaties49 and several  non-binding
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, most notably the Uni-
versal  Declaration  of Human  Rights. 50  Although  the  United States
47. See Bradley  &  Goldsmith, supra note  1, at  838-42; cf  Henkin,  Politics  and
Values, supra note 40,  at 33-39  (distinguishing, among other things,  between "estab-
lished customary  law" and "contemporary  customary  law");  Bruno  Simma & Philip
Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:  Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Princi-
ples, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int'l L. 82, 89-90 (1992)  (distinguishing between "the  old-style of
practice-based  custom, la coutume sage" and "ia coutume sauvage- a product grown in
the hot house of parliamentary  diplomacy  and all too often sold as customary before
having stood the test of time"  (footnote omitted)).
48. See Mark  Janis, An  Introduction to  International  Law  247-48  (2d ed.  1993);
David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 Soc. Research 779,780-81  (1987); Louis
B.  Sohn,  The New International  Law:  Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1982).  On the pre-World  War  II antecedents
to international  human rights law, see Henkin,  Politics and Values, supra note 40, at
169-73.
49.  Among the most prominent agreements, in chronological order, are the  Con-
vention on the Prevention  and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted  by the
U.N.  General  Assembly  Dec. 9,  1948,  102  Stat. 3045, 78  U.N.T.S.  277; the Interna-
tional  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec.  Doc.  C, 95-2, at 1 (1978),  660  U.N.T.S.  195;  the
International  Covenant on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  adopted  by  the
U.N.  General  Assembly  Dec.  16,  1966,  S.  Exec.  Doc.  D,  95-2,  at  1  (1978),  993
U.N.T.S. 3; the International  Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights, adopted  by  the
U.N. General Assembly Dec. 19, 1966, S.  Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at  1 (1978),  999 U.N.T.S.
171;  the Convention on the Elimination  of All  Forms of Discrimination  Against  Vo-
men,  adopted  by the U.N.  General  Assembly  Dec.  18,  1979,  1249  U.N.T.S.  13,  19
I.L.M.  33; the Convention Against Torture and  Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985,  S. Treaty  Doc. No. 100-
20  (1988),  23  I.L.M.  1027,  as  modified,  24  I.L.M.  535;  and  the Convention  on  the
Rights of the Child,  adopted by the U.N. General Assembly  Nov. 20, 1989,28  I.L.M.
1448.
50.  G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d  Sess., at 71,  U.N.  Doc.  A1810 (1948).  Other
prominent resolutions include the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being  Subjected to Torture and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman,  or Degrading Treatment  or
Punishment, and the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, both of which  were even-
tually succeeded  by multilateral conventions.  Human rights resolutions that have not
yet been  succeeded  by treaties  include  the  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of Mentally
Retarded  Persons;  the Declaration on  the  Rights of Disabled  Persons;  the Declara-
tion on the Elimination  of All  Forms  of Intolerance  and  Discrimination  Based  on
Religion or Belief, the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not
Nationals  of the Country  in Which They  Live;  the Declaration on  Social and  Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference
to Foster Placement and  Adoption Nationally and Internationally;  the Principles  for
the Protection  of Persons  with  Mental  Illness  and  for the  Improvement  of Mental
Health Care; and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons  Belonging to National or
Ethnic,  Religious or Linguistic  Minorities. See  Richard  B.  Lillich  & Hurst  Hannum,
International  Human  Rights:  Problems of Law,  Policy, and  Practice  322-23  (3d  ed.FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
has voted in favor of most-but not all-of the resolutions, it has de-
clined to ratify many of the treaties.  Moreover, for the ones that it has
ratified, it has generally  insisted,  through a series of reservations,  un-
derstandings,  and  declarations  ("RUDs"), that the treaties  not apply
as  domestic  law  and  thus  not preempt  inconsistent  state  law.51  As
Professor Spiro explains,  "[T]he Senate has consistently refused  to ef-
fect  any changes in state laws  by way of human rights treaties. ', 52
Through  a  little-understood  and  greatly  under-analyzed  process,
however, these treaties and resolutions are today understood  to be the
sources  of an independent  CIL of human rights.  There is much  de-
bate  about  how  this  new  CIL is  made  and identified.53  One  thing,
however, is clear:  This new CIL  does not reflect the actual practice of
states.  If the traditional state practice  requirement  were still a neces-
sary prerequisite  to the  development  of a CIL  norm, there would  be
very little customary international human rights law, for "it is still cus-
tomary for a depressingly large number of States to trample upon the
human rights of their nationals."54  The change in the way CIL  is cre-
ated, from the "accretion  of practices"  to  a more "purposive  creation
of custom"  through  treaties and  United Nations resolutions, marks  a
"radical  innovation, and indeed  reflects  a radical  conception."55
1995);  Human  Rights  in  the  World  Community:  Issues  and  Actions  53  (Richard
Pierre Claude & Burns  H. Weston  eds.,  1989).
51.  Thus, to take the example of the International  Covenant  on Civil and  Political
Rights, the non-self-executing  declaration  "clarif[ies]  that the  Covenant  will not cre-
ate a private cause of action in U.S. courts."  Committee  on Foreign Relations, Inter-
national  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  S.  Exec.  Rep.  No.  102-23,  at  19
(1992).  The federalism  understanding "serves to emphasize domestically  that there is
no intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority between  the State and Fed-
eral governments or to use the provisions of the Covenant to 'federalize'  matters now
within the competence of the States." Id. at 18.  Specific reservations and other condi-
tions that preserve differences between United States law and the requirements of the
Covenant ensure that "changes  in U.S. law in these areas will  occur through the nor-
mal legislative  process." Id. at  4.  The RUDs for the Covenant  on Civil and  Political
Rights  are  typical  of the RUDs  attached  as  conditions  to  ratification  of  the  other
human rights treaties. See Louis Henkin,  U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conven-
tions: The Ghost of Senator  Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 341  (1995)  [hereinafter Henkin,
US. Ratification].
52.  Peter J. Spiro,  The States and International  Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
567,  574 (1997).
53. See,  e.g., Henkin, Politics and Values, supra note 40,  at 37-39;  Martti Kosken-
niemi, From Apology to Utopia:  The Structure of International  Legal Argument 342-
421 (1989); David P. Fidler, Challenging  the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives
on the Future of Customary International  Law, 39  German  Y.B. Int'l L.  198, 216-31
(1996).
54.  Simma  & Alston, supra note 47,  at  90.
55.  Henkin, Politics and Values, supra note 40, at 37.  Professor Henkin continues:
"Whereas law was made by treaty but grew by custom, now there is some tendency  to
treat custom as a means, alternative  to treaty-making,  for deliberate legislation.  Us-
ing the concept of custom for that purpose brings with it the traditional definition, but
now  practice  sometimes  means  activity  designed  to  create the norm  rather  than  to
reflect it."  Id.  For commentary questioning the legitimacy of this transformation, see,
e.g.,  Simma & Alston, supra note 47,  at  91-100; J.S.  Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy
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Our focus is not on the precise content of this new CIL or its legiti-
macy on the international plane.56  Rather, our focus is on the proper
status  of this new  CIL, whatever its content  and  international  legiti-
macy, in the U.S.  legal  system.  But there  are at  least  three  well-ac-
cepted aspects of the new CIL that are relevant to its domestic status.
First, since  the  new  CIL now  regulates many  of the same  topics  as
domestic law, it conflicts  more frequently with domestic  law than did
the traditional  CIL.  Second, this new  CIL includes  at a minimum the
prohibitions listed in the Restatement (Third).1  Finally, as many com-
mentators  have noted, the enormous  proliferation  of the multilateral
human rights treaties and United Nations human rights resolutions  on
which  CIL is based  suggests that  CIL is  expanding rapidly  and  may
already  be substantially broader than the Restatement (Third)'s list.5 8
and Validity in the Development of Hunman Rights Norms in International  Law,  1979
U. Ill.  Legal F. 609.
56.  Despite statements by our fellow panelists to the contrary, nothing in our for-
mer or present analysis purports to address the merits of this new CIL on the interna-
tional plane. Compare Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra  note  1, at 839 n.156 ("%Ve  take no
position here regarding  the legitimacy  of this transformation  [in  the source and con-
tent of CIL]  ....  ), with Neuman, supra  note 5, at 385 (asserting  that we suggest that
both traditional  and new CIL "has lost its traditional legitimacy"), and Stephens, The
Law of Our Land, supra note 5,  at 453  (referring to "[tihe exaggerated  fear of inter-
national law expressed by authors such  as Bradley and Goldsmith"),  and Goodman &
Jinks, supra note  5,  at 477  (asserting  that we  "lament  the  fact  international  law  in-
creasingly purports  to regulate  'many  areas that were  formerly  of exclusive domestic
concern').
57.  See Restatement (Third), supra  note 6,  § 702 (stating that CIL prohibits geno-
cide; slavery;  summary  execution  or  murder; disappearance;  cruel,  inhuman,  or de-
grading  treatment;  prolonged  arbitrary  detention;  and  systematic  racial
discrimination).  The Restatement (Third) indicated that its list was a conservative one,
and that other actions, such  as religious and gender discrimination, might also violate
CIL.  See id. cmts. j, 1. It further observed  that "[olther  rights may already  have be-
come customary law and international law may  develop to include additional rights."
Id. reporters' note 1.  Many commentators  and international  lawyers have expressed
the  belief that  the  CIL  of human  rights  is  in  fact  broader  than  the  Restatement
(Third)'s list.  Thus, for example, the Human Rights Committee  that was established
in connection with the International Covenant  on Civil and Political Rights has issued
a list "far more expansive" than the Restatement (Third)'s list. Richard B. Lillich, The
Growing Importance of Customary International  Human Rights Law, 25 Ga. J.  Int'l &
Comp. L. 1, 20  (1995/96)  [hereinafter  Lillich,  The Growing Importance].
58.  See Theodor Meron, Human  Rights and  Humanitarian  Norms  as Customary
Law  99  (1989)  ("Given  the  rapid  continued  development  of international  human
rights, the list [of CIL norms] as now constituted is essentially open-ended....  Many
other rights will be added in the course of time."); Restatement (Third), supra note 6,
§ 702 cmt. a (noting that its "list [of CIL norms] is not necessarily complete, and is not
closed:  human rights not listed  in this section  may  have  achieved  the status of cus-
tomary law,  and some  rights might  achieve  that  status  in  the  future");  Lillich,  The
Growing Importance, supra note  57,  at 7  n.43  (reporting  that  in  a  speech  in  1996,
Restatement (Third) Chief Reporter Louis Henkin indicated  that "if he were drafting
Section 702 today he would  include as customary international  law rights the right  to
property  and freedom from gender discrimination,  plus the  right to  personal auton-
omy and the right to live in a democratic society"); Beth Stephens, Litigating Custom-
ary International  Hnuman Rights Norms, 25 Ga. J.  Int'l & Comp. L  191,  198-99  (1995/
96) [hereinafter  Stephens,  Litigating] (describing  CIL as a "developing concept"  andFORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
All of our fellow panelists characterize  the new CIL  applied  by fed-
eral courts in much narrower terms.  Neuman  asserts without further
explanation  that judges  should  apply  only  "genuine,"  well-accepted
CIL. 59  Stephens claims that the CIL  applied by U.S. courts has a nar-
row scope  and  develops  slowly.6°  Goodman  and Jinks  propose  that
the  CIL applied  by federal  courts  be  limited  to jus cogens norms.61
These formulations  are understandably  designed  to narrow  concerns
about the  scope  and  consequences  of the  modern position.  But  the
panelists  fail  to provide  a  theoretical  framework  within  which  these
differing formulations  can be understood  and analyzed.  They  do not
address the radical changes in the post-World War II CIL  lawmaking
process,  and  they  do not explain,  in  light  of these changes,  why  the
CIL applied  by  federal  courts  should  be  limited  as  they  propose.
More  basically,  they fail  to explain  the  far-from-obvious  process  by
which courts are supposed  to identify "genuine"  or-something  quite
different-jus cogens norms of CIL.  In view of the many uncertainties
about how CIL  is identified in the post-World War II period, we can-
not  determine  who  more  accurately  characterizes  the  content  and
scope of the new CIL-the commentators cited in the preceding para-
graph,  or our  critics.  We  do  think, however,  that the  extraordinary
uncertainty  on these crucial issues provides an  additional reason  why
the political  branches  rather than  the courts should  decide  which  as-
pects  of CIL  apply as domestic  federal law.
We are now in a position to understand what is at stake in the mod-
ern position debate.  What is  at stake is the enforceability of interna-
tional human  rights law  in  the U.S.  federal  courts.  There  is  a  large
and  growing  body  of  international  human  rights  treaties.  But  the
United States has either not ratified these  treaties or has ratified them
subject  to  RUDs  that  render  them  unenforceable  as  domestic  law.
The modern position claim  that CIL  is to be  applied  as federal  com-
mon law thus "compensate[s]  for the abstinence of the United States
vis-a-vis ratification  of international human  rights treaties."62  It per-
predicting as likely developments  "environmental  protections  and  the right  to polit-
ical access-i.e., to  vote-and other attributes of democracy").  Commentators  have
argued, for example, that CIL  includes, or will soon include, rights such  as freedom of
thought, free choice of employment, the right to primary education, the right to form
and join trade unions,  and rights relating to sexual  orientation. See Bradley  & Gold-
smith, supra note 1, at 841-42  & nn.169-71  (collecting  a small sampling of sources).
59.  Neuman, supra note  5,  at 376, 27.
60.  Stephens,  The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 451-52.
61.  Goodman  & Jinks, supra note 5,  at 510-11.
62.  Simma & Alston, supra note  47,  at 87.  Professor Lillich  explained  the  point
more  fully  as follows:
Although  Article  VI,  section  2  of  the  Constitution  makes  treaties  the
supreme  law  of the land,  the United States  always can  avoid  or lessen  the
domestic impact of human rights treaties by failing  to ratify them or by rati-
fying them subject to non-self-executing  declarations.  However,  customary
international  law, at least where  the United States has  not persistently ob-
jected to  a particular  norm  during the process  of its formation, ipso  facto
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mits federal courts to accomplish through the back door of CIL what
the  political  branches  have  prohibited  through  the  front  door  of
treaties.
II.  RESPONSE  TO  CRITICS
In this Part, we respond to our fellow panelists' arguments concern-
ing the historical  and democratic bases for the  modern  position, and
the  consequences  of our thesis for  the states, federal  executive  offi-
cials,  and the traditional  CIL.63
A.  Historical Claims
As noted above, much of our critique concerned the historical basis
for the modern position.  Our fellow panelists take  issue with several
of our historical  claims.  First, they challenge  our claim  that  the pre-
Erie decisions  applying CIL do not support the modern position.  Sec-
ond, they  challenge  our  claim  that Sabbatino did  not  establish  the
modern  position.  And, third, they challenge  our claim  that  the mod-
ern position rose to orthodoxy in the 1980s with little scrutiny  of pre-
cedent  or implications.  We consider each  challenge  in turn.
1.  The Pre-Erie Status of CIL
There is little doubt that, before Erie, CIL had the status of general
common  law, not  federal  law.  The Supreme  Court  said  as  much  in
several  decisions  in  the  late eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centu-
becomes supreme federal law and hence may regulate activities, relations or
interests within the United States  ....  Thus, the potential  impact of custom-
ary  international  human  rights  law  upon  the  American  legal  system  is
substantial.
Richard B. Lilich, The Constitution and International  Human Rights, 83 Am. J.  Int'l
L. 851, 856-57 (1989)  [hereinafter  Lillich, The Constitution];  see also Anne Bayefsky &
Joan Fitzpatrick, International  Hwnan Rights Law  in United States Courts: A  Com-
parative Perspective, 14 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 4 (1992)  ("Because  the United States has
been reluctant to ratify human rights treaties, particularly those  with a potential do-
mestic impact,  the nature  of customary  [international]  human  rights law  is  the  key
issue relating to the enforceability of human rights norms  in United States  courts.");
Brilmayer, supra  note 18, at 324  n.87 ("It is not fatal to international law  based argu-
ments that the nation has not signed the relevant conventions.  Human rights norms,
in particular, have in some cases entered  the realm of customary international  law as
to states that have not signed the relevant  international  agreements.").
63.  It is worth noting at the outset that the panelists do not present a comprehen-
sive  defense  of the modern  position.  Thus, for  example,  (a)  none  of the  panelists
claims  that CIL  historically had the status  of federal  law, even  though  the  seminal
decision  approving the modern  position made such  a claim, as  have many  academic
proponents of the modern  position;  (b) none of the  panelists claims  that  CIL binds
the President or overrules inconsistent  federal legislation, even  though many  propo-
nents of the modern position  have made  those claims;  and (c)  each  of the panelists
suggests a view of the structure and content of CIL that is narrower than that typical
of academic proponents  of the modern  position.FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
ries.
64  Many  supporters  of the  modern  position  have  also  acknowl-
edged the point.6 5  And it appears that, to one degree or another, each
of our  fellow panelists  has done  so as well.  CIL's non-federal  status
prior to Erie does not by itself invalidate  the modern position.  But it
does  undermine  the  widespread  reliance  on  pre-Erie precedents  in
support of the modern position.
Although Neuman and Stephens acknowledge that CIL had the sta-
tus of non-federal general common law before Erie, they both seek to
find normative  support  for the modern  position  in history.  Stephens
admits that CIL was part of general common law before Erie and that
cases arising under CIL did not arise under the Constitution or laws of
the United  States.66  She nevertheless  criticizes  our historical  discus-
sion  as a  "simplified  view  [that]  overlooks  the rich and  complex role
international law has played in our legal system for over 200 years."67
She then  sets forth  a long and detailed  description  of the framing of
the Constitution and the historical status of international law.68  In our
prior work, we  addressed each of her points, none of which  affects the
central  truth that CIL was  not viewed  as federal  law  during most of
our nation's history.
Stephens correctly notes, for example, that the framers of the Con-
stitution and early U.S. leaders viewed international law as binding on
the United States.69 But, as we noted in our earlier work, and as Pro-
fessor  Henkin  has  explained,  "[a]lthough  international  law  imposes
obligations on nations, it does not purport  to specify how the nations
must  treat international  obligations  as  a  matter  of  domestic  law."7
During  at  least  the  first  150  years  of  our nation, our  constitutional
system  permitted  states  to  violate  CIL unless  and  until  the  federal
political branches  said  otherwise  through  enacted federal  law.71  Ste-
phens is also  right that one of the Framers'  primary concerns was  the
inability of the federal government during the Articles of Confedera-
tion period to punish infractions of international law, and one of their
primary aims was to establish a constitutional  structure that would  al-
64.  See, e.g., Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264  U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924); Hunt-
ington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892);  New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren,  92 U.S.
286,  286-87  (1875).
65.  See,  e.g.,  Restatement  (Third), supra note  6,  ch. 2,  introductory  note,  at 41;
Henkin, International  Law as Law, supra note  14,  at 1556-58.
66.  See Stephens,  The Law of Our Land, supra note 5,  at  411-12.
67.  Id. at  397.
68.  See id. at 399-433.
69.  See id. at 400-04.  This is the  likely meaning, for example, of John  Jay's state-
ment that "[t]he United States had, by taking  a place  among the nations of the earth,
become  amenable  to the law of nations."  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.  (2 Dall.)  419,
474 (1793).  It also may be what Edmund Randolph meant when he stated  as Attor-
ney General that the law of nations  "is  essentially  a part  of the law  of the  land.  Its
obligation commences and runs with the existence of a nation."  1 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen.
26, 27  (1792).
70.  Bradley  & Goldsmith,  supra note  1, at 819  n.19 (quoting  Henkin).
71.  See id. at 824-26.
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low for uniform federal enforcement of CIL-'  But, as we noted,  and
as  Stephens  seems  to acknowledge,  this uniformity  was  not guaran-
teed by the automatic incorporation  of CIL into federal  law.  Rather,
uniformity was promoted by empowering the political branches to en-
act the federal law necessary to carry out international  obligations and
to create  federal courts with exclusive  federal jurisdiction. 3
Somewhat  inconsistent  with  her  acknowledgment  that  CIL  was
non-federal  general common law, a subsequent section  of Stephens's
article is entitled  "International  Law  as Federal  Law Pre-Erie." This
section does  not live  up to  its  title because  it does  not  cite a  single
example of CIL being treated as federal law prior to Erie. 74  Stephens
first  discusses  Supreme  Court cases  in  the  early  nineteenth  century
that rejected a federal common  law of crimes, even in cases involving
violations  of the law of nations.75  These  decisions  repudiated earlier
intimations that CIL might apply as federal law, and therefore support
our view of CIL's pre-Erie status.76  Stephens then cites judicial opin-
ions  and  other documents  referring  to the  law of nations as  "part  of
72.  See Stephens,  The  Law of Our Land, supra note 5,  at  402-08.
73.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 824-26: see also Stephens,  Tie Law
of Our Land, supra note  5,  at 409-11.
74.  Stephens suggests that the Supreme  Court  recognized  federal  question juris-
diction on the basis of a claim arising under CIL in Oetjen  v. Central  Leather Co., 246
U.S.  297 (1918).  See Stephens, Tire Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 429 & n.190.  In
fact, the Court made perfectly clear that jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was proper
because  the plaintiff in error  had  "set  up  and claimed"  a  "right"  under  the  Hague
Convention  of 1907.  Oetjen, 246  U.S.  at  299; see also  [1918  version  of]  28  U.S.C.
§ 1257  (declaring  that the Supreme  Court's jurisdiction  over states  extends  to final
state court decisions  "where  any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up
or claimed under  [the]  Constitution  or  the  treaties or  statutes  of..  . the  United
States." (emphasis added)).  The fact that the Court went on to reject this treaty claim
on the merits did not affect this basis of jurisdiction.  Nothing in the opinion suggests
that federal jurisdiction  was premised  on CIL  This is not surprising, given that sev-
eral decisions just before and after Oetjen had rejected that possibility. See supra note
64.
75.  See Stephens,  Tire Law of Our Land, supra note 5,  at  415-16.
76.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at 851  & n.231; see also Arthur  M.
Weisburd,  The Executive Branch and International  Law, 41  Vand. L  Rev.  1205,  1213
(1988)  (observing  that, with  these  decisions,  "it  became  clear  that  the  Republicans
had  won  the debate-the  'laws  of the United  States'  did  not  include  either  all  of
'general  law'  or its 'law  of nations'  component").  Stephens  also  cites  the  Supreme
Court's adoption of the "Charnring  Betsy canon" in the early 1800s. See Stephens,  The
Law of Our Land, supra note  5,  at 417.  Pursuant  to this canon, courts, where fairly
possible, are to construe federal statutes not to violate international  law. See Restate-
ment  (Third), § 114;  Murray  v. Schooner  Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.  (2 Cranch)  64,  118
(1804).  This canon  "is influenced  by the fact that the courts are obliged to give effect
to  a federal  statute even  if it  is inconsistent with  a pre-existing rule  of international
law."  Restatement  (Third), § 114,  cmt. a.  Thus, the canon  is entirely consistent  with
CIL's status  in the nineteenth century  as general  common  law, which  was subject  to
being overruled  by federal legislation, and in no way supports the claim that CIL had
the status of federal law.  For a critique of recent attempts to recharacterize  the canon
along the  lines suggested  by  Stephens,  see generally  Bradley,  Tire Charming Betsy
Canon, supra note 20.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
'our  own law,'  "part of the law  of the land,"  and  the like.77  But,  as
we have explained-and Stephens does not really dispute-those ref-
erences reflected CIL's status as general common  law and do not sug-
gest that CIL  was  historically  considered federal  law.78
Stephens finally  argues that a true  federal common law binding  on
the states began to emerge in the late nineteenth  century  in areas re-
lated to  CIL, such  as  in interstate and  maritime cases. 7 9  This is  true
but again  unsupportive of Stephens's  apparent belief that there  were
pre-Erie antecedents  to the  modern position.  The Court's late  nine-
teenth  and early twentieth century federalization  of general maritime
law  and  the general  common  law governing interstate  disputes  were
justified under the theory that Article III's grant of admiralty and  in-
terstate  jurisdiction  authorized  federal  courts  to  develop  a  uniform
and supreme  federal law within these jurisdictions. 80  These  develop-
ments, however, did not extend to most areas of general common law,
and they most definitely  did not extend  to  CIL  (which,  unlike  admi-
ralty and interstate disputes, is not listed  as a separate head of federal
judicial power in Article III).8  The Court's analysis in the interstate
dispute cases  makes  clear its continuing  belief that international  law
was not federal law.82  The same is true of the maritime cases.  In the
very same year that the Court began to treat the general maritime law
as  federal  law, 3  it held  that  CIL was not federal  law.'  The  Court
reached  this conclusion  over Justice Bradley's  lone dissent,  in which
he  argued,  like Stephens, that  CIL should  be treated  as  federal  law
77.  See Stephens,  The Law of Our Land, supra note  5,  at 417.
78.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at  824,  849-51.
79.  See Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note  5,  at 419-25.
80.  See Southern  Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917)  (admiralty); Kan-
sas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46,  97  (1907)  (interstate  dispute).
81.  An early draft of Article III, apparently  written by James Wilson, would have
extended  federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under the "Law of Nations."  See 2
The Records of the Federal  Convention  of 1787, at  157 (Max Farrand ed. 1937).  The
reference  was deleted, however, without explanation. See Henkin, International  Law
as Law, supra  note  14, at 1560 n.22; Jay,  The Status of the Law of Nations,  supra note
11,  at 830.
82.  The most prominent such case,  as Stephens  notes, is Kansas v.  Colorado,  206
U.S. 46 (1907).  This decision  developed an "interstate  common law"  to govern inter-
state disputes. Id. at 97-98.  Referring back to its earlier decision in the same dispute,
the Court said the sources for this new law were "[f]ederal  law, state law, and interna-
tional  law, as the  exigencies  of the particular case  may  demand."  Id. at 97  (quoting
Kansas  v. Colorado, 185  U.S.  146 (1902)).  The Court's distinction  between  interna-
tional  and  federal  law  is  consistent with  the  view  that  CIL was  applied  during  this
period  as general common law.
83.  As Stephens notes, the  decision that first squarely held that admiralty  law was
binding  on  the states,  Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244  U.S. 205  (1917),  cites  The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558  (1875),  as support for this proposition. Stephens, supra note
5,  at 426-27  n.176 & accompanying  text.
84.  See New York Life Ins.  Co.  v. Hendren,  92 U.S. 286 (1875).  The Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review "general laws of war, as recognized  by  the law of
nations  applicable  to this case,"  because  they do not  involve "the  Constitution, laws,
treaties,  or executive proclamations  of the United  States."  Id. at 286-87.
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because of the need for uniformity in  foreign  relations.' -  The  Court
continued to hold  this view right up until  its decision in  Erie.'
Neuman takes a  different tack from Stephens.  Rather than  trying
to glean nineteenth  century precursors to  the modern  position,  he ig-
nores the difficulties that inhere in relying on the pre-Erie decisions as
support for the modem position.  Thus, while he acknowledges  CIL's
pre-Erie status as general common  law, he nonetheless insists that the
modem position is in the "well-established  tradition of incorporation"
-with a "pedigree  stretching  back to the beginning  of the Republic."'
Similarly, he refers to the "200-year-old  practice of judicially  incorpo-
rating customary international  law."''
These assertions fail to take account of the fundamental  differences
between pre-Erie general common  law  and post-Erie federal common
law.  Like the Filartiga  court's  similar  move, Neuman  wants  CIL  to
apply automatically  as federal law in our post-Erie world on the  basis
of precedents that applied  CIL  automatically as non-federal law under
a framework rejected in Erie. The questionable nature of such a move
is compounded  by the fact that the primary relevance  of the modem
position concerns the new CIL  of human rights, which, unlike the CIL
applied by the pre-Erie precedents,  regulates the way  in which a  na-
tion treats its citizens.8 9
The failure to take account  of these fundamental  contextual differ-
ences between the modem position  and  the historical  application  of
CIL  is precisely what has led  courts and  scholars to rely  on pre-Erie
decisions that did not implicate federal question jurisdiction  as a basis
for federal question jurisdiction;  on pre-Erie decisions  applying tradi-
tional customary inter-national law that did not purport to trump state
law  as support for the proposition  that the new CIL  of human  rights
trumps state law; and on pre-Erie CIL  decisions  that did not  bind the
Executive under the Take Care Clause as support for the view that the
Executive is so bound under the Take Care Clause.  The modem posi-
tion's reliance  on  the pre-Erie precedents  is  not,  as  Neuman  insists,
85.  Justice  Bradley  argued  that  "unwritten  international  law"  was part  of the
"laws of the United States"  because the law  of nations  was an exclusive federal  con-
cern. Id. at 288.  He  added:  "It  is  highly  expedient  that obligations  and  immunities
[under the  law  of nations],  arising  from public  law  and  the  public  relations of the
government, should be subject to uniform  rules, and  to the final  adjudication of the
judicial department of the general government."  Id. Stephens calls the result in Hen-
dren "strange"  and  Neuman  calls  Bradley's dissent  "prescient."  See  Stephens,  The
Law of Our Land, supra  note 5,  at 428; Neuman, supra note 5,  at 374 n.14.  Whether
or not  these judgments  are  warranted,  the  fact  remains  that  eight  members of the
Supreme Court in that case rejected  the modern  position.
86.  See cases cited supra note 64.
87.  Neuman, supra note  5,  at 376,  388  (emphasis added).
88.  Id. at 392.
89.  Cf Trimble, A Revisionist View, supra note 42,  at 723  ("IThere  is substantial
doubt  that modern  customary  international  law  is  entitled  to claim  any  legitimacy
from the tradition of the law of nations.").FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
merely "old  wine in new bottles." 9 0  It is a new and much more potent
wine in bottles made  to look  old.
2.  Sabbatino
Our fellow  panelists do not dispute that all post-Erie federal  com-
mon law, including a federal common law of CIL, must be authorized
by the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute.  They instead argue that
the  authorization  can  be found in  the  structure  of  the  Constitution,
and they rely heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino9t
for this proposition.
In  assessing  this  argument,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  among
three  possible  claims  concerning  Sabbatino.  The  first  claim  is  that
Sabbatino itself held that CIL is federal  common law.  All  of our fel-
low panelists can be read as making this claim.92  This claim, however,
is contradicted by Sabbatino itself.  It is true that Sabbatino favorably
referred  to  a  three-page  essay  by Philip Jessup,  in which  he  had  ar-
gued  soon  after Erie that CIL should  be  uniformly  enforced  by  the
federal courts.93  But one can view this reference as evidence that Sab-
batino embraced  the  modern  position  only  if  one  ignores  what  the
Court in  Sabbatino actually  held and  did.  The Court  held  only  that
the act of state doctrine  has the status of federal common law.94  And it
made clear that the act of state doctrine is not part of CIL.95  Instead,
the  Court explained  that  the act  of state doctrine  "arises  out of the
basic  relationships  between  branches  of government  in  a  system  of
separation  of powers." 9 6  Moreover,  the  Court relied  on  the  act  of
state doctrine in Sabbatino as a reason for not applying CIL as domes-
tic law-the opposite  of what the modern position  requires.97  This is
90.  Neuman, supra note  5,  at 380.
91.  Banco Nacional  de Cuba v. Sabbatino,  376 U.S. 398  (1964).
92.  See Neuman,  supra note  5,  at 375-76,  29;  Stephens,  The Law of Our Land,
supra note 5, at 484-89; Goodman  & Jinks, supra note  5,  at  445-46, 528.
93.  See Philip  C. Jessup,  The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v.  Tompkins Applied to
International  Law, 33  Am. J. Int'l L. 740 (1939).
94.  See Banco Nacional  de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427  (1964)  ("We con-
clude  that  the scope  of the act  of state  doctrine  must  be determined  according  to
federal  law.").
95.  There are at least four statements  in the majority opinion to this effect. See id.
at 421  ("We do not  believe that  [the act of state]  doctrine  is compelled  ...  by  some
principle of international law."); id. ("That international law does not require applica-
tion  of  the  doctrine  is  evidenced  by  the  practice  of  nations.");  id.  at  422
("[I]nternational  law  does not prescribe  use of the doctrine."); id. at 427  (the  act of
state doctrine is "compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution").  The
dissent  also agreed  with this point. See id. at 444 (White, J.,  dissenting)  (noting  that
the  act  of state doctrine  is  "not a principle of international  law").
96.  Id. at  423;  see  also id.  at  427-28  (stating  that  the  act  of  state  doctrine  is
designed  "to  reflect  the  proper  distribution  of  functions  between  the  judicial  and
political  branches of the Government  on matters  bearing upon foreign  affairs").
97.  Id. at 439; see also id. at 431  (stating that the import of the Court's prior deci-
sions  was that "the  act of state doctrine  is  applicable  even  if international  law  has
been violated").  Goodman and Jinks  assert that the Court held that  the act  of state
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why  the  decision  was  viewed  at  the  time  of  its  announcement  as  a
major setback for the application  of CIL in U.S. courts.9s
Despite the  Court's clear statements  coficerning  the  separation  of
powers rather than international law  basis for the act of state doctrine,
Goodman and Jinks attempt  to link it with international  law in order
to  bring  the  modem  position  within  the  Court's  holding. 9  The
Supreme Court in its most recent act of state decision,  however, said
unequivocally that the act of state doctrine is considered today "a  con-
sequence of domestic separation  of powers.""lco  And,  this  is how  the
lower courts, including courts supportive of the modern position, have
interpreted Sabbatino.11  It is also how most commentators have read
the decision.'  Finally, if it were in fact true that the Supreme Court
held in Sabbatino that CIL  is  federal common  law,  one  would have
expected  the  Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law,  pub-
lished  one year  after Sabbatino, to have  noticed  such  a  holding.  In
fact, the  Restatement (Second) said that,  notwithstanding  Sabbatino,
doctrine precludes only  the application of international  law that  has a "disputed,  in-
choate, or undefined  status."  Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5,  at 484.  They  point to
statements  by the Court suggesting that  the act of state doctrine  might not preclude
the consideration of all international  law issues. See Sabbatino, 376  U.S.  at 428, 430
n.34; Goodman & Jinks, supra  note 5, at 481-97.  It is far from clear, however, that the
Court was endorsing independent judicial application of CIL, let alone application as
supreme federal  law.  The Court referred  to "treat[ies]  or other unambiguous  agree-
ment/sJ," Sabbatino,  376  U.S. at 430 (emphasis added),  which likely  meant only trea-
ties  and executive  agreements,  not  CIL.  And,  indeed,  the  only  international  law
exception  to the act of state doctrine generally recognized  by  the lower courts since
Sabbatino  is for treaties, not CIL. See Gary B.  Born, International  Civil  Litigation in
United States Courts 738-44 (3d  ed. 1996); see also id. at 743 (stating that -Sabbatino
appears to have  rejected any such possibility"  of a CIL  exception  to the  act of state
doctrine);  Callejo  v.  Bancomer,  764 F.2d  1101,  1117  n.18  (5th Cir.  1985)  (-\Ve are
unaware of any cases since Sabbatio that have construed customary international  law
to invalidate a foreign act of state.").
98.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at  830 & n.96  (collecting sources).
99.  Goodman  & Jinks, supra note 5,  at 488.
100.  W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.  v. Environmental  Tectonics  Corp.,  493  U.S. 400, 404
(1990).
101.  See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,249 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the act
of state doctrine "reflect[s]  the judiciary's concerns regarding separation of powers");
Republic  of the Philippines v. Marcos,  806  F.2d 344,  358  (2d  Cir. 1986)  (stating that
"Sabbatino treats the act of state doctrine as resting  fundamentally  on separation of
powers concerns").
102.  See, e.g.,  Clark, supra note 24, at 1303 & n.273 (stating that  -the  requirement
that federal courts  adhere  to the act of state doctrine stems  from the  constitutional
separation of powers"); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational  Public Law Litigation, 100
Yale LJ.  2347,2363 (1991)  (stating that the Court in Sabbatino  "shift[ed]  ground from
a comity/conflict-of-laws  rationale  [for  the  act  of state  doctrine]  to a  separation-of-
powers/political-question  grounding"); see also Anne-Marie  Burley, Law Among Lib-
eral States: Liberal Internationalism  and the Act of State Doctrine,  92 Colum. L Rev.
1907,  1911  (1992)  [hereinafter  Burley,  Law Among  Liberal States] ("According  to
conventional wisdom, Sabbatino  transformed  the act of state doctrine from a conflicts
doctrine to  a doctrine  of delimitation of competence  based  on separation of powers
principles.").FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
the status of CIL in U.S. courts was "not settled."1 3 This is presuma-
bly why the Restatement (Second) did not attempt to describe the do-
mestic  legal  status  of  CIL  in  its  black-letter  provisions.  Indeed,
Professor Covey Oliver, one of the reporters for the Restatement (Sec-
ond), has informed us that he and the other reporters "simply  did not
find authority to support the position that the...  Restatement (Third)
[later] took.
1 0 4
A  second  claim  one  might  make  concerning  Sabbatino is  that,
although  the  decision did  not  itself  adopt  the  modern  position,  the
logic of its federalization of the act of state doctrine applies equally to
the  status of CIL.  At least with respect  to the separation  of powers
claims  of  the  modern  position-that  CIL  as  interpreted  by  federal
courts binds the Executive and perhaps  overrules inconsistent  federal
legislation-this  claim  too  is rebutted  by Sabbatino itself.  Whatever
else it may have said or implied, Sabbatino made clear that the federal
political branches rather than the courts have primary responsibility  to
make federal foreign relations law.105  It was in recognition of this fact
that the Court in Sabbatino crafted the act of state doctrine to prohibit
the domestic application  of CIL.  It thus makes no sense to read Sab-
batino as authorizing courts, in the name of deference to the political
branches in the area of foreign relations, to bind the political branches
to judicial interpretations  of CIL.'06  This is perhaps  why none of our
fellow panelists seeks to defend that element of the modern position.
They  do  not explain,  however,  how  CIL  can  be federal  law  without
binding the Executive under the Take  Care  Clause. 07
This leaves the claim that Sabbatino permits federal courts to make
federal  foreign relations  law that trumps  inconsistent  state  law.  Be-
cause of Sabbatino's  novel application of what soon came to be known
as the federal common law of foreign relations,0 8 this is a more plau-
103.  Restatement  (Second)  of the Foreign Relations  Law of the United States  § 3,
reporters'  note 2 (1965)  [hereinafter Restatement  (Second)].  In  a statement that fur-
ther assumes that Sabbatino  itself did not hold that CIL is federal law, the Restatement
(Second) added that "the  holding of the Sabbatino  case  that Erie  v. Tompkins  does
not apply  to the act of state doctrine would appear to  apply a fortiori to questions of
international  law."  Id. (emphasis added).
104.  Letter  from Covey T. Oliver to Curtis A. Bradley 1 (1997)  (copy  on file with
the Fordham Law Review).
105.  See Banco Nacional  de Cuba v. Sabbatino.  376  U.S. 398,  431-33  (1964).
106.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at 860-61.
107.  All of our fellow panelists wish  to assign the  status of federal  law to CIL but
none of them is willing  to defend any implications of this status other than  those for
federal  court jurisdiction  and preemption  of state  of law.  This is  an  insufficient  re-
sponse.  If  CIL  is  part  of the  "Laws  of the United  States"  within  the  meaning  of
Articles III and VI, then why,  for example,  is it not also part of the  "Laws"  that  the
President  must  faithfully  execute?  CIL's status  as  federal  law cannot  be  defended
simply  by  pointing to  some  implications  of this  status  that  might  be desirable  and
ignoring other possible implications  that might not be desirable.
108.  See  John  Norton  Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965  Duke  L.J.
248,  261-91; Friendly, supra  note  31,  at 408 n.119.
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sible position.  It is far from certain, however.  The majority opinion in
Sabbatino is  notoriously inscrutable,1 9 and  there  is much debate  re-
garding  the  justifications  for  and  scope  of  the  federal  lawmaking
power that it conferred  on federal courts.  Some  commentators  sug-
gest that it broadly authorizes  federal courts to make federal  common
law,  subject  to congressional  override,  whenever  courts  decide  that
federal  foreign relations  interests so  require." 0  Others  would apply
the doctrine more narrowly based on a balance of functional consider-
ations."'  Yet others who are sensitive to Sabbatino's  emphasis on the
relative incompetence  of courts  to make  foreign relations judgments
view  the doctrine  as  one  that "protect[s]  courts  from entanglements
in, and interbranch conflicts  about, matters  for which  they are not in-
stitutionally suited.""' 2  Finally, some argue that the federal common
law of foreign relations lacks normative justification  and has been ef-
fectively  repudiated  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  years  since
Sabbatino  ."'
Our  earlier  work  explained  in  detail  why  we  think  that  most  of
these  readings  will  not  support  the  modern  position's  federalism
claims." 4  One  major problem  is that, regardless  of the  scope of  the
federal  common  law  of foreign  relations,  it is  far from  clear  that it
justifies federalization  of the new CIL of human rights, which governs
not primarily  interstate  relations  but rather  the  relations  between  a
nation and its  citizens.  We  wish to  re-emphasize  here  an  additional
point that substantially undermines any support that Sabbatino might
otherwise  have provided  for these claims.
The federal common law  authorized in Sabbatino, like all non-con-
stitutional federal common law, "implements the federal Constitution
and  statutes, and is conditioned by them."I"  The modern position  is
109.  For an excellent discussion of the uncertainties  raised by Sabbatino, see Louis
Henkin,  The Foreign Affairs Power of the  Federal Courts: Sabbatino,  64  Colum. L
Rev.  805 (1964)  [hereinafter Henkin,  The Foreign Affairs Power].
110.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 6.2.4, at  350 (2d ed.  1994)
("Sabbatino still stands for the important proposition that  in cases related to foreign
affairs, federal courts may fashion federal common law."); Martin H.  Redish, Federal
Jurisdiction:  Tensions  in the Allocation  of Judicial  Power  125 (2d  ed.  1990)  (stating
that Sabbatino  recognized  "the power of the federal judiciary to create  federal  com-
mon law in the field of international  relations").
111.  See, e.g., Harold  G. Maier,  The Bases and Range of Federal  Common Law in
Private International  Matters, 5  Vand. J.  Transnat'l L.  133,  159-73  (1971)  [hereinafter
Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Conunon Law].
112.  Stephen  B.  Burbank,  Federal Judgments  Law:  Sources  of Authority  and
Sources of Rules, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1551,  1577 (1992); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Territo-
rial  Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J.  Int'l  L  505.  550-52
(1997)  [hereinafter  Bradley, Territorial  Intellectual Property Rights] (making a similar
point).
113.  See Jack Goldsmith,  Federal  Courts, Foreign Relations, and Federalism, 83 Va.
L. Rev.  1617 (1997).
114.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at  860-70.
115.  D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal  Deposit Ins. Corp., 315  U.S. 447, 472
(1942)  (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Neuman, supra note 5, at340  FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  66
relevant  today  mainly with  respect to  the new  CIL of human rights.
The  primary  source  of  the  CIL of  human  rights  is  the  multilateral
human rights treaties.1 16  As  we  noted  above, however,  the political
branches have sought, through non-ratification  or through ratification
conditioned by RUDs, to ensure that these international human rights
treaties do not apply as  domestic federal  law and  do not preempt in-
consistent state law.1 17  This means  that the federal political branches
have declared, contrary to the modern position, that a principal source
of the CIL of human rights should not be considered  a source of fed-
eral  law.  The logic  of post-Erie federal  common  law,  even  under a
broad  reading of Sabbatino, does  not permit federal  courts to  do via
federal common  law what the political  branches have  clearly prohib-
ited in their conditional assent to these treaties.  This is especially true
given that, as the Supreme  Court has repeatedly  emphasized, federal
court deference to political branch wishes should be at its apex in this
foreign relations  context." 8  As  a result, even  the broadest  possible
reading of Sabbatino  fails to support the modern position with respect
to the new CIL.  None  of our  fellow panelists  has addressed  this  dis-
381 ("Federal common law is made within the framework of existing federal statutes,
and not in contradiction to it.").  One consequence  of this is that the federal common
law of foreign relations remains subject to congressional revision.  Thus, for example,
Congress overruled  Sabbatino's  act of state holding. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)  (1994)
(declaring that an act of state doctrine shall not prevent U.S. courts presented with "a
claim of title or other  right to property"  from  inquiring into  the  validity  of foreign
expropriations  of such  property  under  international  law),  constitutionality upheld,
Banco Nacional  de Cuba v. Farr, 243  F. Supp.  957, 971-73  (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 383
F.2d  166, 178-83  (2d  Cir. 1967).
116.  See Henkin, Politics  and Values,  supra note  40,  at 36;  Bradley  & Goldsmith,
supra note 1, at 832, 839-40; Louis  B. Sohn, The New International  Law:  Protection  of
the Rights of Individuals Rather  than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 12  (1982)  [hereinaf-
ter Sohn,  The New International  Law].
117.  See supra notes 50-52  & accompanying  text.
118.  See,  e.g.,  Chicago  & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman  Steamship  Corp.,
333 U.S.  103,  111  (1948)  (stating that foreign  policy decisions "are  wholly confided by
our Constitution to the political departments  of the government, Executive and Legis-
lative");  Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302  (1918)  ("The  conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed  by the Constitution to the  Execu-
tive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government  ....  ).  We  are
baffled  by Neuman's  oblique  suggestion  that our thesis has  a kinship  with  the pro-
posed  Bricker Amendment.  See  Neuman, supra note  5,  at  385.  That  Amendment,
which had various versions, would have (among other things) limited the power of the
Senate  to  consent  to  self-executing  treaties.  See  Duane  Tananbaum,  The  Bricker
Amendment  Controversy 32-48, 221-23  (1988).  Our thesis does not in any way entail
these or any other limitations on the Senate's power.  To the contrary, our thesis urges
respect for the Senate's  and the President's consistent exercise  of their constitutional
prerogatives  to  condition  assent to  these  human  rights  treaties  on  the  exclusion  of
these  treaty norms  from domestic federal law.  By ignoring and circumventing  these
exercises  of the Senate's  treaty power, it is the modern position, not us, that attempts
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positive  argument  against judicial  incorporation  of  the  new  CIL  of
human rights.119
3.  The Rise of the Modern  Position
Much of Neuman's  article is devoted  to the claim  that our account
of the  recent rise of the modem  position  is  "badly  misinformed.' 12
He  says  that  we  "assert[]  that  the  Reporters  [of  the  Restatement
(Third)] misled  the  American  Law  Institute  into  adopting  an  ap-
proach supported only by academic commentary"'  21  and that the ALI
was  "subordinated  to  academic  fiat."'"  He further  asserts  that  our
critique of the modem  position is "embedded  in a bizarre  conspiracy
theory."'1 3
Neuman has distorted  our account.  We did not  say  that the acad-
emy "misled"  or "subordinated"  anyone,  or that the rise of the mod-
em position  resulted  from a  "conspiracy."  Nor  did  we  impugn  the
motives of those who claimed in 1980 that it was well settled that CIL,
including the new CIL of human rights, had the status of federal  law.
We acknowledged that, by 1980, the modern position  had the support
of some prominent academics and, based on an a-historical  reading of
The Paquete Habana, combined  with  a  casual  reading of Sabbatino,
appeared  plausible. 24  Our claim regarding  the rise  of modem  posi-
tion was, and is, simply that its adoption  in  1980 by both the ALI and
the  Second  Circuit  in  Filartiga  was  not supported  by  decisional  au-
thority and was not accompanied  by substantial  debate regarding  its
dramatic consequences  for domestic legal governance.2'
Here is a brief summary  of the  historical  record:  In  1965,  the Re-
statement  (Second)  correctly  observed-after  expressly  considering
the significance  of Sabbatino'26 -that  the domestic legal status of CIL
was "not settled."' 7  In 1980, however, the Tentative  Draft of the Re-
statement (Third) proclaimed  that CIL's status as domestic federal law
119.  Neuman  comes  closest  to addressing  this  argument  when  he  states  that  the
argument  "deserves  exploration with greater precision  and documentation"  than we
have provided, and raises several questions about it. Neuman, supra note 5, at 387  &
n.78.
120.  Neuman, supra note 5,  at 377.
121.  Id.
122. Id. at  378.
123.  Id. at 371.
124.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note  1. at 874.
125.  See id  at 827-38.
126.  The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Second), promulgated in 1962, did not
contain  any statement  about  the domestic  legal status  of CIL  This  draft  required
revision  after  the  1964 Sabbatino decision.  See 41  A.LI.  Proc. 21,  57-58.  The  final
version of the Restatement (Second) contained  the new Reporters'  Note 2 to Section
3,  which was not contained  in  the  1962 draft, and  which  stated  that  CIL's domestic
status was "not settled."
127.  Restatement (Second),  supra note  103.  § 3 reporters'  note 2.342  FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW  [Vol. 66
"had  now been  established" 12  and  that "courts  have  declared"  that
CIL is supreme  federal law.  The Restatement, however, did not cite  a
single  decision  since  the publication  of  the Restatement (Second) in
support  of  these  views.  The  final  1987  version  of  the  Restatement
(Third) did cite one of Chief Reporter Henkin's law review  articles in
support of the modern position. 2 9  But that article cited only the 1980
Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) for the very proposition-
"general  agreement" that CIL was federal law-for which it was being
cited in the final version of the Restatement (Third).3 °  This is what we
referred  to  as  "pure  bootstrapping" 131-and  that  is  exactly  what  it
was.
Although the Restatement (Third) itself failed to cite supporting de-
cisions issued  after the Restatement (Second), Neuman has found one
decision  in  the  1965-1980  period  that  he  claims  the  Restatement
(Third) could have cited-the Second  Circuit's decision in Fiocconi  v.
Attorney  General.3  This  decision  declined  to  apply  CIL,  and,
although  it  did  appear  to  assume  that  CIL  was  judicially  enforcea-
ble,133 it never considered  CIL's status in  the U.S. legal system.  This
single, uncertain dictum certainly does not demonstrate what Neuman
refers  to  as  a  "widely  held  conclusion,  shared  by judges"  in  1980  in
support  of  the  modern  position. 34  Similarly,  had  the  Restatement
128.  Restatement  (Third) of the Foreign Relations  Law of the United States (Ten-
tative Draft  No.  1 1980),  pt. I,  ch. 2, introductory  note at 40-41.
129.  See  Restatement  (Third), supra note  6,  pt. I,  ch.  2, introductory  note  at  42
(citing Henkin, International  Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev.  1555
(1984)).
130.  Henkin, International  Law as Law, supra note  14, at  1559-60  & n.22.
131.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at 836.
132.  462  F.2d  475  (2d  Cir. 1972).  Neuman  also  cites  the  Nixon Administration's
amicus curiae brief  in Republic of Argentina v.  City of New  York,  250 N.E.2d  698
(N.Y. 1969), which argued  in the context of consular immunity  that  CIL was  federal
law. See Neuman, supra  note 5, at 377.  But this brief, which obviously is not a judicial
precedent and thus does not support the Restatement (Third)'s claims, shows  only that
the  modem  position  was  plausible  enough  after Sabbatino to  be  invoked  when  it
suited  the Executive's ends.  Later Executives  would similarly  embrace or reject the
modern position  in amicus briefs as it suited their political needs.  Thus, for example,
the Reagan Administration largely disavowed  the modem  position in  its brief in  the
Marcos litigation in  the Ninth Circuit. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae at 3-5,  9-10, 12, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493  (9th  Cir. July  10,  1989)  (No. 86-
2448).  Moreover, there obviously has not been Executive support for the proposition,
advanced by a number of proponents  of the modem position, that the Executive  does
not  have the authority  to  violate CIL.  Indeed,  the Executive  has refused to comply
with  CIL in a number of prominent cases  in recent years. See, e.g.,  United  States  v.
Alvarez-Machain,  504 U.S.  655  (1992)  (involving  the  abduction  of foreign  citizen);
Garcia-Mir  v. Meese, 788  F.2d  1446 (11th  Cir. 1986) (involving  the detention of un-
documented  aliens).
133.  See Fiocconi, 462 F.2d  at 479 n.7.
134.  Neuman, supra note  5,  at 378.  In addition  to being  dicta, the court's  interna-
tional law  analysis in Fiocconi rested  on a premise that appears  to  have  since  been
rejected by the Supreme Court.  The issue for the court in Fiocconi  was whether addi-
tional criminal charges that had been filed against two defendants after they had been
extradited to the United States should have been dismissed pursuant to the "specialty1997]  HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS  & U.S. LAW  343
(Third) bothered  to cite Fiocconi, the  decision  would  not  have  sup-
ported its claim that, since 1965, "a  different view  [about the domestic
status of CIL] has prevailed."' 35  Nor would it have  supported  its as-
sertion that  "[t]he  courts  have  held that  ...  federal  determinations
and  interpretations  of customary  international  law are also supreme
over state law."' 36  Even today  we  cannot  find  a  single  decision  that
squarely  holds  that  CIL is  federal  law  within  the  meaning  of  the
Supremacy  Clause.
37
Neuman also invokes  the Filartiga  decision, which  was decided  the
same year as the publication of the first Tentative Draft of the Restate-
ment (Third).  This  decision did, of course, endorse the modem  posi-
tion.  The  final  version  of  the  Restatement (Third),  however,  never
cited this decision for the  domestic legal status  of CIL.  This may be
because Filartiga's  endorsement  of the modern  position rested on the
premise  that  CIL had  historically  been  treated  as federal common
law,'38 whereas  the Restatement (Third) correctly  acknowledged  that
doctrine,"  which,  when  it applies,  precludes  prosecution  of a person  who  has  been
extradited for an offense other than the one for which the person was extradited.  The
court noted that, if the matter were res nova, it might well hold that the issue was "not
a matter proper for judicial cognizance,"  since  the additional  charges did not  violate
any statute or treaty. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d  at  477.  The court, however,  thought  itself
bound to consider the claim because of an 1886 Supreme Court decision,  United States
v. Rauscher,  119 U.S. 407 (1886), which it construed as holding that the specialty  doc-
trine is judicially enforceable as a matter of CIL  or federal common  law. Fiocconi,  462
F.2d  at 478-79.  The court's premise-that  the specialty doctrine  recognized  in  Rau-
scher was a matter of CIL  or federal common law-appears to have been rejected, at
least implicitly, by the Supreme Court in  United States v. Alarez-Machain,  504  U.S.
655 (1992).  There, both the majority and the dissent characterized Rauscher  as having
interpreted an extradition treaty, not as having announced some independent princi-
ple of CIL or federal  common  law. See  id. at  659; see also id. at  675  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting).
135.  Restatement (Third), supra  note 6, pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note at 42 (empha-
sis added).
136.  Id., § 1, reporters' note  5,  at  14 (emphasis  added).
137.  Neuman also contends that, while "[t]he  court's reasoning may be susceptible
to different interpretations,"  the New York Court of Appeals recognized  in Republic
of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y.  1969), that "it applies custom-
ary international law by obligation and not...  by choice."  Neuman, supra note 5, at
377 n.36.  The court  in that case, however, never clearly explained  its views concern-
ing the status  of CIL, probably because the  principal dispute  in that  case concerned
the content of CIL, not its status. See Argentina, 250 N.E.2d at 699.  The court's cita-
tion of pre-Erie  decisions suggests that it may have had something in mind similar  to
general common law. See  i.  at 700.  In  any event, the CIL applied  in  that case  has
little current relevance to domestic litigation, since  consular immunity is regulated by
the Vienna  Convention  on Consular Relations,  to which  the United  States is  now a
party. See Vienna Convention  on Consular Relations  and Optional  Protocol on Dis-
putes, Apr. 24, 1963,  21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.  Approximately  158 nations have
ratified  the  Convention.  Multilateral Treaties Deposited with  the Secretary-General,
United  Nations,  New  York  (ST/LEG/SER.E),  as  available  on  http'JlVww.un.org/
DeptslTreaty on Oct. 28, 1997.  Although  it is conceivable  that a  case could  arise in-
volving the immunity  of a consulate  not  covered  by the Convention, there  has  not
been even one such case  in U.S. courts.
138.  See Filartiga  v. Pena-Irala,  630 F.2d 876,  886  (2d  Cir. 1980).FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
CIL was treated  as general  common  law before  Erie.' 39  Despite the
questionable  premise  of the  Filartiga decision,  a  number  of  courts
have  relied on Filartiga  for the  modern position  with very little scru-
tiny  of  its  reasoning.1 40  And  neither  Filartiga  nor  its  progeny  have
focused  on the  implications  for domestic  lawmaking  processes of as-
signing  federal  common law  status to  CIL.  We  described  the rise  of
the modern position as characterized  by this sort of insufficient delib-
eration, not by deception.
14 1
While we did not claim and do not believe that the modern position
resulted  from  a  "coup,' 4  we  do  believe  that  Neuman  significantly
understates  the  influence  of the American  academy  on the  enforce-
ment  of human rights law in the United States.  This influence  has at
least  two  dimensions.  143  First,  American  academics  have  played  an
important role in the development of the new  CIL, through their par-
ticipation  in international institutions as well as through the writing of
treatises  and  law  review  articles. 44  Academic  influence  has been  so
substantial that Professor Sohn, one of the Reporters  for the Restate-
ment (Third) and  a leading human rights commentator,  observed  re-
cently  that "states really never make international  law on the subject
of human rights," but rather  "[i]t is made by  the people that care; the
professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of
articles in leading international  law journals."'
14 5
139.  See Restatement  (Third), supra note  6,  ch. 2, introductory note  at 41.
140.  See,  e.g.,  Kadic  v.  Karadzic,  70  F.3d  232,  246  (2d  Cir.  1995);  Xuncax  v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp.
787,  798 (D. Kan.  1980). But cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726  F.2d 774,  801
(D.C.  Cir. 1984)  (Bork, J.,  concurring)  (criticizing  Filartiga's  logic  but  not  directly
questioning the  view that CIL is  federal  common  law).  Neuman  acknowledges  that
Filartiga  and its progeny "would  have been more scholarly if they had accurately por-
trayed the stage-by-stage  evolution of U.S.  approaches  to international law,"  but  he
defends  Filartiga's  reasoning as an  "attempt[ ] to synthesize cases from  all  periods of
U.S.  history."  Neuman,  supra note  5,  at  379-80.  We  fail  to see  how  a fundamental
misunderstanding  about  history constitutes a proper synthesis of history.
141.  It  is against the baseline of this mischaracterization  of our earlier article  that
Neuman asserts that in this Article we "distance  [ourselves] from the accusations that
[the  earlier  article]  made  about  the drafting  of  the Third  Restatement."  Neuman,
supra note 5,  at 388.  We did not say what he says we  did in  our first  article, and we
have not changed  our views here.
142.  Neuman, supra note 5,  at  377-78.
143.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at  875-76.
144.  See Janis, supra note 48,  at  51-52, 79-84.  As Professor Janis notes, "the  deci-
sions of judges..,  and the doctrines of scholars have played  a surprisingly important
part in the development  of international  law."  Id. at 79; see also, e.g.,  David Massey,
Note, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law:  The Reasonable-
ness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 Yale J. Int'l  L. 419
(1997)  (explaining  the predominant  role of academics  in the development  of the rea-
sonableness  standard  typically stated  to  be a  CIL limitation  on  the  extraterritorial
application of a  nation's laws).
145.  Louis  B.  Sohn, Sources of International  Law, 25  Ga. J. Int'l  & Comp. L.  399,
399  (1995/96)  [hereinafter Sohn,  Sources].
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Second,  academic  commentators  have  almost  uniformly  endorsed
the modem position.  They have done so through their involvement in
drafting the influential Restatement (Third) as well  as through writing
numerous law review articles  proclaiming the modern  position as set-
tled doctrine.  In  addition, amicus curiae briefs  and affidavits  written
by academic  proponents of the modern  position  have now become  a
staple  of  international  human  rights  litigation. 46  Moreover,  some
scholars have been testifying in such cases as expert witnesses, and not
only  about  the content  of  CIL but also  about  its  status  in  the  U.S.
legal system. 47  The views of academic commentators may be particu-
larly influential in this context, given the relative unfamiliarity  of U.S.
judges  with  international  law  as  well  as  the  traditional  deference
courts have  paid to scholars concerning  international  law issues.' 4 8
B.  Democracy
Our  earlier  work  maintained  that  judicial  federalization  of  CIL
without political  branch  authorization  is  inconsistent  with  American
constitutional  democracy  on  two  grounds. 149  The  first  concerns  the
non-American  source  of  the  CIL that  the  modern  position  obliges
courts  to  apply  as  federal  law.  This  law,  as  Professor  Henkin  has
noted, "is not made by the United States and through its governmen-
tal institutions alone but by them together with many  foreign govern-
ments in a process to which the  United States contributes  only in  an
uncertain  way  and  to  an  indeterminate  degree."'" 0   The  second
ground concerns  the application  of this law  against states by  federal
courts without  the filter  of constitutional  or legislative authorization.
We argued that this was  inconsistent with the Supreme  Court's mod-
em federalism jurisprudence, especially in the context of the new CIL,
which  implicates  traditional  state  prerogatives.'1 5  The  Supreme
Court's abandonment  in the 1980s of federalism as a substantive limit
on federal power was justified by the premise that state interests were
protected in Congress by the "internal safeguards  of the  political pro-
146.  There are many examples. See, e.g., Kadic v.  Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,  235-36 (2d
Cir. 1995)  (numerous amicus curiae briefs submitted to the court, many of them bear-
ing the names of law professors); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,  185  (D.  Mass.
1995)  (citing joint affidavit from 27 international  law scholars); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
694 F. Supp. 707,  709  & n.2 (N.D.  Cal.  1988)  (noting  affidavits  from  eight  interna-
tional law scholars); see generally Lillich, The Growing Importance,  supra note 57, at
23-24 (referring to the "ubiquitous...  'Affidavit  of International  Law Scholars'  that
has become the norm in recent human  rights cases").
147.  See Harold  G.  Maier,  The Role of Experts in  Proving International Human
Rights Law in Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L  205, 217-
19  (1995/96)  [hereinafter  Maier,  The Role of Experts].
148.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 874-76.
149.  See id  at 857-59,  868-69.
150.  Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note  12,  at 508 n.16, see also Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra  note 1, at 850.
151.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at 868-70.FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
cess."'1 52  But this  political  process justification  for  federal  intrusion
into state prerogatives  does not apply when federal courts  apply CIL
as  federal  common  law  in  the  absence  of  political  branch
authorization.
53
The  manner  in  which  U.S.  courts  apply  customary  international
human rights  law  raises  a  third  type  of democratic  concern  not  ad-
dressed  in our earlier work.  In the  typical case,  a  U.S.  court  applies
CIL to regulate the mistreatment abroad of one alien by another alien
acting  under  color  of foreign law.154  The United  States  may  be  the
only country in the world that applies customary international human
rights law in this fashion.155  Even assuming that the defendant-alien's
country has consented to this law  on the international plane, there is
no evidence that this consent extends to domestic  enforcement in the
United  States  or any  other  country.  Indeed, it is  the  absence  of  an
agreed-upon  customary  law  of  domestic  enforcement  that  requires
federal courts in so many human rights cases to imply a cause of action
as a matter of U.S.  law.'56  The point is even more  apparent with  re-
spect  to  the  numerous  remedies  created  by federal  courts  in  these
cases.  On remand in Filartiga,  for example, the district court  created
and  awarded  a  punitive damages  remedy that was not contemplated
by either international law, Paraguayan law, or enacted United States
law.
157
It is against this background that one must consider Neuman's argu-
ment  that judicial  federalization  of  CIL  is  democratic  because  it  is
152.  See Garcia  v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,  469 U.S. 528,  556  (1985).
153.  The  Supreme  Court's  recent  reinvigoration  of  federalism  limits  on  federal
power  only strengthens  this  argument.  See,  e.g.,  Printz v.  United  States,  117 S. Ct.
2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992);  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991).  These decisions may represent a retreat from the "political  process"
theory of Garcia.  See John Yoo,  The Judicial  Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L.
Rev.  201  (1997).  The point remains,  however, that  to the  extent  that  the  political
process rationale justifies any federal  intrusion on state interests, it does so  only with
respect to political branch enactments and not to pure federal common  law. See Mer-
rill, supra note  32, at 17.
154.  See, e.g.,  Filartiga  v. Pena-Irala,  630 F.2d  876  (2d  Cir. 1980).
155.  See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human
Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand  Marcos, 20 Yale J. Int'l L. 65,  101  (1995)
("[N]o  other  nation  invites  such  cases  into  its  courts.");  Beth  Stephens,  Litigating,
supra note 58,  at 200  ("International  human  rights litigation  will greatly  increase in
value  if it is  conducted in  many countries around  the  world, not just in  the  United
States.").
156.  See Beth Stephens & Michael  Ratner, International Human  Rights Litigation
in U.S. Courts  112-18 (1996); Steinhardt, supra  note  155, at 72-82; see also William R.
Casto,  The Federal  Courts' Protective Jurisdiction  over Torts Committed in Violation of
the Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467,  475  (1986)  ("There  is serious  doubt  ...
whether international law, unassisted  by domestic law, creates a tort remedy that may
be invoked  in domestic courts  by private  individuals.").
157.  Filartiga,  577 F. Supp. at 860; see generally Steinhardt, supra note 155, at 93-98,
101-03  (explaining that in ATS cases many  remedial  issues  like  damages  have  been
governed  by  federal common  law because  of "lack  of international  precedent"  and
proposing  international  treaty to fill this gap).
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subject to congressional  revision. 5  This  argument  first  of all  proves
too  much.  It  would justify  the  creation  of any  (non-constitutional)
federal common law, including  the Swift-ian  general common  law ex-
pressly abrogated in Erie,  since  all such law can be overruled  by Con-
gress.  Moreover,  Neuman's  argument  runs  counter  to  the  normal
constitutional presumption  that state law governs  in the face of polit-
ical branch silence.'59  The Supreme Court's reversal of this presump-
tion in the dormant commerce clause context has been justified on the
ground that the federal political branches by themselves are incapable
of protecting important federal prerogatives. 60  Neuman has made no
such argument in the context of CIL, however, and there is little basis
for one. 61  Finally, if judicial  common law-making  is constitutionally
improper-as we think it is in this area-it should not  be allowed  to
occur in the first place.' 62
158.  See Neuman,  supra note  5,  at 387; see also Brilmayer, supra note  18,  at  334,
336; Michael J. Glennon, Process Versus Policy in Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs
and the United States Constitution, 95 Mich. L. Rev.  1542,  1553  (1997)  (book review)
[hereinafter  Glennon,  Process Versus  Policy]; Henkin,  International Law as Law,
supra note 14,  at 1566.  Not all  proponents  of the modem  position  even agree  that
Congress  can in fact overrule judicial  applications  of CIL  See supra note 20.
159.  See Merrill, supra note  32, at 37.
160.  See Julian  Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91  Yale  i.J.
425,  435  (1982);  Ernest J. Brown,  The Open Economy  Justice Frankfurter  and the
Position of the Judiciary,  67 Yale L.i. 219, 222 (1957);  Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of
National Power Vis-a-Vis the States:  The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86  Yale
LJ. 1552,  1586 (1977).
161.  See Goldsmith, supra note  113.
162.  See Merrill, supra note  32,  at 22.  Neuman  also  contends  that  if the  modern
position is undemocratic  on the federal level,  then allowing state courts to apply CIL
without legislative authorization  would be equally  undemocratic. See Neuman, supra
note 5, at 383-84.  As noted above, it is not at all clear that our position would  lead to
independent applications of CIL by the state courts.  Nor are we endorsing such  a role
for these courts.  If state  governments did  decide  to allow their  courts to act  in  this
way, however, there is probably nothing in the federal constitution that would prevent
them from doing so.  State institutional arrangements, including the relative power of
state courts  vis-a-vis  state political  branches,  generally  are  not  a  matter of  federal
constitutional  concern.  Thus, for example, many state  courts are  authorized  to pro-
vide advisory opinions, but "it is firmly established that federal courts cannot [do so]."
Chemerinsky, supra note 110, § 2.2, at 48.  More significantly, state courts may engage
in general common-lawmaking,  but the federal courts have been disallowed from  do-
ing so since 1938. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981)  ("Federal
courts, unlike state courts, are  not general  common-law courts and do  not possess a
general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision."); cf Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938)  ("[W]hether  the law of the State shall be declared by
its  Legislature  in  a statute  or by  its  highest  court  in  a  decision  is  not  a matter  of
federal concern.").  Like these issues, the legitimacy of state court applications of CIL
is a matter of state constitutional  law, which may or may not allow for it.  Neuman  is
therefore incorrect in asserting that the "same problem"  associated  with the modern
position  also  exists  with respect  to  state court applications  of CIL  Neuman,  supra
note 5, at 383; cf Bradley, Territorial  Intellectual  Property Rights, supra note 112 (not-
ing similar points to explain differential treatment of extraterritoriality  of federal  and
state statutes).  This  is  not  to  argue  that  independent  application  of CIL by  state
judges  is  democratic;  at  least  for  unelected  state judges,  our  democracy  concernsFORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The  Supreme  Court  recently  rejected  arguments  very  similar  to
Neuman's in a related  foreign relations context.  In Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Board of California, 163  the  Court  considered  a  chal-
lenge under the dormant commerce  clause to the constitutionality  of
California's  "worldwide  combined reporting" method for taxing mul-
tinational corporations.  This state law had provoked  enormous diplo-
matic controversy with the United States'  closest trading partners  and
had  been  opposed  in  numerous  executive  pronouncements."64  The
Court  nevertheless  rejected  the  claim.  It  explained  that  concerns
about  foreign  sovereign  retaliation  were  "directed  at  the  wrong  fo-
rum"  because  courts  lack  the power  "to  balance  a  particular  risk  of
retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States  as a whole
to let  the  states tax  as  they please.' 1 65  The  Court  also  dismissed  as
irrelevant  the  California  scheme's  inconsistency  with  "Executive
Branch communications  [including amicus briefs]  that express federal
policy  but lack the force of law.' 1 66  What mattered  to the Court  was
that no validly enacted federal law had preempted  the state action.' 67
Similar reasoning can be found in the Court's recent federal common
law  decisions.'
6 8
The democratic  pedigree  of the modern  position  contrasts sharply
with the processes by which the other principal form  of international
law-treaties-are  incorporated  into  federal law.169  Treaties  are ne-
gotiated by the Executive and generally take the form of written docu-
ments.  Formal  ratification  under  Article  II  requires  both  the
agreement  of  the  Executive  and  the  "advice  and  consent"  of  two-
might argue against judicial activism in applying CIL at the state level.  But this would
hardly constitute  an  argument  for the modern  position.
163.  512  U.S. 298  (1994).
164.  Id. at 324  n.22,  328-29.
165. Id. at 328  (quoting Container Corp. of America  v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463  U.S.
159,  194 (1983)).
166.  Id. at 330.
167.  See  id. at  331  ("[W]e  leave  it  to Congress-whose  voice,  in  this  area, is  the
Nation's-to  evaluate whether the national interest is best served  by  tax uniformity,
or state autonomy.").  Stephens claims  that this decision supports the modern position
because  it shows  that  "in  areas  touching upon  foreign affairs  and  international  law,
great  deference  is  paid to the political  branches."  Stephens,  The Law of Our Land,
supra note 5,  at  448 n.282.  She does not  explain how such deference,  however, sup-
ports  independent judicial  authority  to  preempt state law-the  very  thing called  for
by  the modern  position  yet  rejected  in Barclays Bank.  Moreover, Stephens  fails  to
consider  the substantial  empirical  evidence,  discussed  above,  that  suggests  that  the
political  branches  do not  want  the  new  CIL  to be  automatically  incorporated  into
domestic law.  In light of that evidence, deference to the political  branches clearly cuts
against the modern  position, not in  favor of it.
168.  See Atherton  v. FDIC, 117 S.  Ct. 666,  670-74  (1997);  O'Melveny  & Myers  v.
FDIC,  512  U.S. 79,  87-89  (1994).
169.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at  858-59.
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thirds of the Senate. 7'  Even less formal "executive agreements"  usu-
ally  involve  the  concurrence  of  at  least  a  majority  of  CongressY7 1
Moreover, neither  formal  treaties  nor  executive  agreements  are  en-
forceable federal law unless they are "self-executing"  in nature or are
accompanied  by implementing  federal  legislation. 1 -
By contrast, CIL is  unwritten and relatively  amorphous.  The date
and circumstances  of its creation  are often  uncertain.  And no formal
endorsement  from this country's representatives  is  required  in order
for it to have  binding force  on the  international  plane.  Indeed,  this
country can be bound by CIL concerning  which  it has  taken no posi-
tion  at all.
1 73  Despite these  features, which  from the  perspective  of
domestic  governance  make  CIL  less  democratic  than  treaties,  the
modern  position claims  that all of CIL is automatically self-executing
federal law.  Even more dramatically, this claim is made in the face of
a consistent  refusal  by the  political  branches  to  allow  human  rights
treaties, the source of much of the new CIL, to become self-executing
federal  law.  In our  view,  any defense  of the  modern  position  must
adequately  explain  this  anomaly.  None  of our  fellow  panelists  has
even attempted to do so.
C.  States
Our  earlier  work  concluded  that  federal  courts  should  not  apply
CIL as federal law without some authorization to do so by the federal
political branches.  This view does not, as Neuman  and Stephens ap-
pear to believe, require that CIL be a matter of state common law.174
Their error is to assume  that (a)  CIL must be enforceable  by  courts,
and (b)  if it is not enforceable as federal law, it must be enforceable  as
state law.  They have provided no argument for (a),  and (b)  is wrong.
Under Erie,  if CIL is not federal law, federal  courts are not to apply it
unless they determine  that it is part  of state  law.  We suspect  that in
most cases, states would rarely incorporate  CIL into state law.  In this
170.  See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.  2 (stating that the President  "shall have Power,
by and with the  Advice and  Consent of the Senate,  to make Treaties,  provided  two
thirds of the Senators present concur").
171.  See Loch K. Johnson, The  Making of International  Agreements  (1984).
172.  See Restatement  (Third), supra note  6. § 111(3).
173.  See id at pt. I, ch. 1, introductory note at  18 ("[States may be bound  by a  rule
of customary law that they did not participate in making if they did not clearly dissoci-
ate themselves  from it during the process of development.").
174.  See Neuman,  supra note 5, at 382 (referring  to our "State  law  proposal"  and
our "[r]educ[tion  of] customary international  law  to State common  law");  id. at 382
(asking "which  State's common  law"  would  govern  under our proposal);  hiL  at  383
(describing our "proposed solution"  as "enforcement  of customary international  law
as  State  common  law");  Stephens,  The  Law  of Our Land, supra note  5,  at  395
(describing our argument  as one  that would  make  CIL  "part of state law");  but ef
Neuman, supra note  5,  at  388  n.80  (noting  that  under our  proposal,  "State  courts
would be free to adopt, reject, or impose their own vies of customary international
law").FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
circumstance,  CIL simply would  not be  a  rule of decision  in  federal
court.
The  claim that states have  even a potential  role in interpreting  CIL
unless and  until Congress  acts to preempt them may seem surprising.
But it should not.  States have always played  an important role  in en-
forcing U.S. obligations under CIL, even with respect to inter-national
affairs.175  And this traditional  CIL  is not even what is  at stake in de-
bates  over  the  modern  position.  As  explained  above,  most  of  the
traditional CIL  that is relevant to domestic litigation has been federal-
ized  by the political  branches in  treaties and  statutes.
With respect to what is really at stake in the modern debates-the
enforcement  of international  human  rights law-a potential  role  for
states  seems  even  less  problematic.  Many  human  rights issues-for
example, the legality of the juvenile  death penalty-fall  within tradi-
tional state  prerogatives that should  be interrupted,  if at all,  only by
the states  themselves or the federal political branches.  In addition, if
the states did incorporate international human rights norms into their
law, this would only make them more rights-protecting  than  the fed-
eral government, something that the Constitution allows in other con-
texts. 1 76  In this connection,  we  are surprised  by Stephens's  assertion
that our position entails  "a  quite radical view of state jurisdiction. "177
Assume, for example, that a state interpreted  CIL  to prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual preference and enacted a state statute to
incorporate this international law into state law.  Assuming no conflict
with the  Constitution  or a  federal statute,  there  is nothing  obviously
"radical"  about  allowing  the state such  authority. 178
Neuman and Stephens object that states cannot incorporate or vio-
late international  law  because  such  tasks  are  exclusive  foreign  rela-
tions  prerogatives  of  the  federal  government. 179   This  is  the
conventional  rhetoric.  When  looked at closely,  however,  it does  not
even hold true for traditional foreign relations functions. The Consti-
tution  limits states'  roles  in a  few, specifically-defined  foreign  affairs
contexts,  as listed  in Article  I, Section  10.  And  it gives the political
branches broad powers to preempt the states in  areas relating  to for-
eign  affairs. 8'  The Supreme  Court's statements  about federal  exclu-
175.  See  Bradley & Goldsmith,  supra note  1, at  825-26;  see also Henkin,  Foreign
Affairs, supra note  12, at  150-51.
176.  See Bradley,  The Status of Customary International  Law, supra note 23.
177.  Stephens,  The Law of Our Land, supra note  5,  at 397.
178.  For a different explanation of how independent  state authority  to incorporate
international law  might  actually advance  the  cause of human rights, see  Spiro, supra
note 52.
179.  Neuman, supra note 5, at 375-77;  Stephens,  The Law of Our Land, supra note
5,  at 438-41.
180.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.  1 (granting Congress  the power to "collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, [and] to... provide for the common Defence"); id. cl.  3
(granting Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"); id. cl.  4
(granting Congress the power to "establish  a uniform Rule of Naturalization");  id. cl.
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sivity  in  foreign  relations  that  Neuman  and  Stephens  cite  were  all
made  in  cases  in  which  the  Court  was  upholding  federal  political
branch enactments.81  They do not stand for the much different idea
that federal  courts  can  on  their  own  prerogative  preempt  state  law
under a foreign affairs  rationale.  Such a  power  was  asserted  for the
first time in the 1960s,11 and, as we said above, the legitimate scope of
this power is highly contested.
Neuman's and Stephens's "foreign affairs exclusion" position makes
even less sense with respect to the new  CIL  that is centrally  at issue
here.  This new CIL regulates intra-national  affairs traditionally  regu-
lated by states in the absence of federal legislation.  Even if there were
a judicially-enforceable  preemption  for  state  actions  on the  interna-
tional plane, it  requires  more argument  than  Neuman  and  Stephens
have provided to show that a state's treatment of its own  citizens is an
action  on  the  international  plane.  Moreover,  it  makes  little  sense
under a foreign relations preemption rationale for courts to apply this
customary international human rights law against the states, especially
since, as mentioned above, the political  branches  have taken  pains to
ensure that the treaties  upon which  this law is based  do not  apply  as
domestic federal law.
D.  Executive Officials
As noted above, one of the possible implications of the modern po-
sition is that CIL  is judicially enforceable  against the President.  There
has been substantial debate among proponents of the modern position
5 (granting Congress the power to "regulate  the Value ...  of foreign  Coin");  i.  cl. 10
(granting Congress  the power to "define  and punish ...  [o]ffences  against the Law  of
Nations"); id. cl. 11  (granting Congress  the power to "'declare War,  grant  Letters  of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water"); id.
cls. 12-13  (granting Congress  the power  to "raise  and support Armies"  and "provide
and maintain a Navy"); id.  cl. 14 (granting Congress  the power  to regulate  -land  and
naval Forces");  id. cl. 16  (granting Congress  the  power  to organize,  arm,  discipline,
and train the militia); id. art. II,  § 1,  cl. 1  (vesting  the executive  power  in  the Presi-
dent);  id. § 2,  cl. 1  (providing  that  the  President  is  the  commander-in-chief  of the
armed  forces); id.  cl. 2  (granting the President  the power,  "by  and  with the  Advice
and  Consent  of the Senate,  to make  Treaties,  provided  two  thirds  of the  Senators
present concur"); id  (granting the President the power, "by  and with  the Advice and
Consent  of the Senate,  [to]  appoint Ambassadors,  other public Ministers  and  Con-
suls"); id. cl.  3 (providing that the President  "shall  take  Care  that the Laws be  faith-
fully executed").
181.  See Neuman, supra note 5,  at 375-76;  Stephens.  The Law  of Our Land, supra
note 5,  at 438-41.  Thus, for example, the Court  in  Hines v. Da-idowitz, 312  U.S.  52
(1941),  held that a state immigration statute  was preempted  by a similar federal stat-
ute, id at 56; the Court in United States v. Pink,  315  U.S. 203 (1942),  and United States
v.  Belmont, 301  U.S. 324 (1937),  held that  an Executive  Agreement  preempted state
property laws; and the Court upheld a statutory delegation of power to the President
in United States v.  Curtiss-Wright  Export Corp., 299  U.S. 304,  318  (1936).
182.  See Henkin,  Foreign  Affairs, supra note  12,  at  163;  Bradley  & Goldsmith,
supra note 1, at 864; Hans A. Linde, A  New Foreign-Relations  Restraint on American
States: Zschernig v. Miller, 28 Z. Ausi.  Off. Recht Vokerr.  594,  602-03 (1968).FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
over  this  issue.183  On  the  one  hand,  the  Constitution  obligates  the
President  to  "take  Care  that the Laws  be  faithfully  executed." ' 184  If
CIL  has  the  status  of  federal  common  law,  it  may  be  part  of  the
"Laws"  covered  by this obligation.  On the  other hand,  dicta  in  The
Paquete Habana  suggests that CIL is not judicially enforceable against
the President. 85  And such judicial  enforcement  would seem  to raise
special separation-of-powers  concerns, since the President needs flexi-
bility in representing  the United States on the international plane and
plays  a  central  role in  articulating  the  U.S. position  concerning  the
content of CIL.'86
In our prior work, we briefly described this debate and emphasized
that the claim that CIL is judicially enforceable  against the President,
like  the  other  implications  of the  modern  position,  depends  on  the
proposition  that  CIL has  the  status  of federal  law.187  Neuman  con-
tends  that  our discussion  of this issue  "collapses  all  relevant  distinc-
tions,"""' apparently because we did not distinguish between low-level
and high-level  executive  officials and among various presidential  acts.
Some proponents of the modern position have made such distinctions
in  evaluating  the  relationship  between  the  Executive  and  CIL.'89
Such distinctions, however, are relevant  only  if one  accepts the mod-
ern position claim that CIL is federal law.  If it is not federal law, it is
not by itself binding-as a matter  of U.S. law-on even low-level  ex-
ecutive  officials  and is  not judicially  enforceable  with respect  to any
presidential  acts.  Since we were not advocating the modern position,
the  distinctions  referred  to  by  Neuman  were  not  relevant  to  our
analysis.
Neuman  also  contends  that, by  not focusing  on these  distinctions,
we  have  missed  "one  of  the  central  difficulties"  with  our  analysis,
namely  that  it  "would  free not  only  the  President,  but also  federal
officers at every level  to commit violations  [of CIL]."' 90  This conten-
183.  See supra note  19.
184.  U.S.  Const. art. II, § 2,  cl. 2.
185.  See The Paquete  Habana,  175 U.S.  677,  700  (1900)  (noting  that  CIL is judi-
cially enforceable  "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision"); see also id. at 708 (stating that  courts must "give  effect  to"
customary  international law "in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their
own government in relation to the matter"); see also Restatement  (Third), supra note
6,  § 115, reporters'  note 3 (discussing this language).
186.  See Restatement  (Third), supra  note 6,  § 112 cmt. c; Henkin, International  Law
as Law, supra  note  14, at  1568-69; Weisburd, The Executive  Branch, supra note 76, at
1253-56.  The  President  also  may need  flexibility  in this area  in order  to help  bring
about  changes in  CIL. See Trimble, A Revisionist View, supra note 42,  at 711-12.
187.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 845-46.
188.  Neuman, supra note 5, at  381.
189.  See, e.g.,  Jonathan  I.  Charney, May the President Violate Customary Interna-
tional law?:  The Power of the Executive Branch of the  United States Government to
Violate Customary International  Law,  80 Am. J.  Int'l L. 913,  921-22  (1986);  Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 20,  at 884.
190.  Neuman, supra note  5,  at 382.
[Vol.  661997]  HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS  &  U.S. LAW  353
tion overlooks a crucial fact:  The conduct of low-level executive  offi-
cials  is  already  subject  to  federal  control  by  the  President  and
Congress.  The domestic  regulatory,  statutory,  and  other  limitations
on the actions of executive  officials undoubtedly reflect, and will  con-
tinue  to  reflect,  principles  of international  law. 9'  The  only  issue  is
whether the judiciary  should have independent lawmaking authority to
regulate  the compliance  of executive  officials  with  international  law.
The judiciary  lacks  such  independent  authority  with  respect  to  all
other  areas  of  executive  law  compliance,  and  Neuman  has  not  ex-
plained  why  special judicial  power  is  needed  here.  Neuman  misses
this point because he mistakenly assumes that the compliance of exec-
utive  officials  with  international  law is  dependent  on federal judicial
lawmaking.
192
E.  Traditional  CIL
As  noted  above,  our  critique  focused  on  the  new  CIL.  We  did,
however,  consider the  relevance  of our  thesis  for traditional  CIL."'
Nevertheless,  Neuman says  our analysis  "neglects  the effect  of deny-
ing federal  character  to  the  'old'  [CIL]." 194  Neuman  appears  to  be
suggesting that it would be unthinkable  to  deny federal common  law
191.  Consider, for example, the recently-enacted  War Crimes Act, which authorizes
the punishment of war crimes if the "person committing  such breach or the victim of
such breach  is a member of the  Armed  Forces of the United States or a national of
the United States."  18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. 1997).  Interestingly, even the violation of
CIL at issue in  The Paquete Habana-the  seizure  of a fishing vessel  by a  Navy admi-
ral-may not have required independent judicial lawmaking  for its correction, given
that the President had announced  that the military  was  to comply  with international
law  in the U.S. conflict with  Spain. See 175  U.S. 677,  712  (1900):  see also Michael  J.
Glennon, May the President  Violate Customary International  Law?:  Can the President
Do No Wrong?, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 923, 923  n.6 (1986)  [hereinafter Glennon, May the
President Violate Customary International  Law?] (making this point).
192.  Neuman also  argues that CIL must be federal  law so that judges can  use  it to
regulate their own conduct. See Neuman, supra  note 5, at 383-85.  We  are not exactly
sure what conduct Neuman has in mind.  The only example he provides is the decision
by a court whether to give immunity from suit to a consulate, something that, as noted
above, is already largely regulated by treaty.  Other than immunity from suit, it is not
clear  what sort of actions  by judges  themselves  would  implicate  international  law.
One possibility might be conducting  a criminal  prosecution  against a foreign  defend-
ant who has been abducted  from another country.  The Supreme Court, however, may
have already rejected  the argument  that CIL operates  as a restraint  on judicial con-
duct  in that situation.  See United  States  v.  Alvarez-Machain,  504  U.S.  655,  666-70
(1992)  (allowing  trial  against  defendant  abducted  from  Mexico);  see also  United
States v. Alvarez-Machain,  971  F.2d 310, 311  (9th Cir.  1992), as modified,  1992  U.S.
App. LEXIS 28367,  *1-*2 (9th Cir. Nov. 3,  1992)  (suggesting that  the Supreme Court
may  have  foreclosed  the  CIL argument);  The Suprene Court, 1991  Tenu; Leading
Cases, 106  Harv.  L. Rev.  163,  322-23  (1992)  ("[B]y  chance  or design.  the  Supreme
Court disposed of Alvarez-Machain's  potentially  viable customary  international  law
defense  without analysis.").
193.  See Bradley  & Goldsmith, supra note  1, at  869.
194.  Neuman, supra note  5,  at 372.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
status to traditional CIL and that we should therefore have exempted
such  CIL from our analysis.
The lack of such an exemption in our earlier work was intentional.
Our position is that the judicial federalization  of all CIL requires some
authorization  from the  Constitution or a  federal statute.  It is  impor-
tant to keep in mind, however, that the authorization requirement has
little if  any practical significance  in connection  with  traditional  CIL.
As explained  above, the federal political  branches appear  to have in-
corporated  into federal  law  most if not  all  of traditional  CIL that is
likely to come  up in  domestic litigation.  The debate  about CIL's do-
mestic  status  in  the  last  three  decades  has  almost  exclusively  con-
cerned new, rather than traditional, CIL.  It is significant that Neuman
can  cite only hypothetical  and  academic  examples  of the  need for  a
federal common law of the traditional CIL.1 95  Within the real world,
gaps either have not appeared in the federal political branches'  statu-
tory  and  treaty incorporations  of the traditional  CIL or courts have
not viewed the traditional CIL as  a relevant source  of law  to fill such
gaps.1 96  As we noted above, this explains why the traditional  CIL has
not been  much  discussed  in  debates  about  the  modem  position.  It
also suggests that the political branches have, consistent with our view
of the way the world should work, done a fairly comprehensive job of
incorporating  the  traditional  CIL that  matters  into federal  law.  Fi-
nally, it suggests that the justification for the modem position should
195.  Neuman provides two hypothetical possibilities:  the CIL of consular immunity
and  the  purported  CIL  limits  on  the  extraterritorial  application  of state  law.  We
know of no decision  in recent times that treats either of these  CIL norms  as a  rule of
decision  or defense in domestic litigation,  and Neuman  provides  none.
196.  The reason  why  the consular  immunity problem has not  arisen is  that, as ex-
plained above, most nations of the world have ratified the Vienna Convention of Con-
sular  Relations.  The  reasons  for  the  apparent  non-relevance  of  CIL  limits  on
extraterritorial  jurisdiction are more complicated.  First, the Permanent  Court  Inter-
national Justice famously  viewed  these limits to be weak in S.S. Lotus (Fr.  v.  Turk.),
1927  P.C.I.J.  (ser. A)  No.  10  (Sept.  7).  The Restatement (Third) adopts  a stronger
view of these limits, see Restatement (Third), § 403, but, as other commentators  have
pointed  out, the Restatement (Third)'s views  on this  issue  may  not  reflect  CIL. See
Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International  Law:  The Demise of Restate-
ment Section 403, 89 Am. J. Int'l 53  (1995)  [hereinafter Trimble, The Supreme Court
and International  Law].  Second,  CIL limits on extraterritorial  jurisdiction  might  be
weaker than or co-extensive with federal constitutional limits on state extraterritorial
jurisdiction.  See, e.g.,  Home  Ins. Co.  v. Dick, 281  U.S.  397, 343  (1930)  (holding that
application  of Texas law to  an insurance  contract  made in  Mexico  and  governing  a
Mexican  risk violates due process).  Third, the Supreme Court has considered numer-
ous challenges in recent years to extraterritorial assertions of state and federal author-
ity without even suggesting that CIL might operate  as a rule of decision in  this area.
See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax  Bd., 512  U.S. 298,  315  (1994)  (upholding  Califor-
nia's worldwide unitary  tax method claimed  by many  to violate  CIL); Hartford  Fire
Ins. Co. v. California,  509 U.S. 764, 769  (1993)  (upholding extraterritorial  application
of U.S.  antitrust  law  claimed  by  many  to  violate  CIL);  United  States  v.  Alvarez
Machain,  504  U.S. 655,  699-700  (1992)  (upholding the validity of the President's par-
ticipation in a foreign abduction  which was  claimed by  many  to violate  CIL).
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not rise or fall on the basis of purely hypothetical situations involving
traditional  CIL.
Of course, it is  conceivable  that in domestic  litigation  a  CIL issue
might arise that is not plausibly  governed  by  a federal  treaty  or stat-
ute.  If this happens, there should be little  to fear from  a regime that
places the responsibility  for deciding whether  and  how  to  federalize
this issue  on  the  federal  political  branches. 97  This  is,  after  all,  the
normal  presumption  of our  constitutional  order.  And,  especially  in
the context of traditional international  law, there is absolutely  no rea-
son to think the political branches  cannot quickly  and effectively  re-
spond  to such  a  rare  circumstance.  Not  only  can  Congress  quickly
respond to such issues, but in the foreign  relations  context  the  Presi-
dent has a number of constitutional lawmaking powers and lawmaking
powers  delegated  from  Congress  that  he  can  employ  in  emergency
situations.19
197.  Neuman says that we "give no serious attention"  to the difference between the
traditional  and  the new  CIL, and  that  we  "avoid  trying to  understand  the  implica-
tions"  of  this  hypothetical  about  CIL  limits  on  state  extraterritorial  jurisdiction.
Neuman, supra note 5, at 392.  We  do not know what more we could do to respond to
Neuman's  concerns  and  hypotheticals.  We  have  made  clear  that  the authorization
requirement applies  to  the  new  and  traditional  CIL alike;  we  have stated  that  this
requirement  has  little  relevance  to  the  traditional  CIL  because  of  the  political
branches'  comprehensive  federalization  of these  matters;  in  support of this view  we
have pointed out that the traditional  CIL's domestic legal status has not arisen  in any
decision in decades; we have specifically responded to his extraterritorial hypothetical
by pointing out many examples in which federal courts have not treated  CIL limits on
extraterritorial  jurisdiction  as  controlling  in  domestic  litigation;  we  have  acknowl-
edged  that an  issue concerning  the  traditional  CIL could  nevertheless  conceivably
arise in domestic litigation; and we have made clear that we believe the responsibility
for federalization  of any residual traditional  CIL issues that  might  arise  should rest
with the political branches, not the federal courts.  One might disagree with our analy-
sis, but we do not believe  the analysis  "evidence[s]  no effort to investigate  what the
consequences  of [our]  proposal  would  be  for the 'old'  customary  international  law."
Id  at 392.
198.  Perhaps  Congress's  most  sweeping  delegation  of lawmaking  power  to  the
President  is  the  International  Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act  ("IEEPA"),  50
U.S.C. § 1701  (1991).  By its terms, this statute is triggered only in  the event of "any
unusual and  extraordinary  threat, which  has  its source  in  whole  or substantial  part
outside the United States, to the national  security,  foreign policy,  or economy of the
United  States."  Id.  But  this  requirement  has  not  in  fact  substantially  limited  the
scope of the statute, given  that presidents "have  declared national  emergencies  with
little regard to whether a real emergency  has actually existed." Harold  Hongju Koh &
John  Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar  Defense.  The Fabric of Economics and
National Security Law,  26  Int'l  Lawyer  715,  744  n.126  (1992).  IEEPA  enables  the
President to respond quickly to suspend or invalidate state law that interferes with or
impedes the federal government's  ability to conduct  foreign  affairs.  The best known
example is the invocation of IEEPA by Presidents Carter and  Reagan to lift state-law
judicial attachments on Iranian  assets and suspend  private  (state  law) claims  against
Iran as part of a deal to secure release of the hostages in Iran. See Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453  U.S. 654 (1981).FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
III.  THE  ALIEN  TORT  STATUTE  AND  THE  TORTURE  VICTIM
PROTECTION  ACT
In our earlier work, we argued  that courts should not apply CIL as
federal law unless the federal political branches authorized  them to do
so.  We  did  not,  however,  evaluate  whether  any  particular  political
branch  enactments constitute  sufficient authorization. 199  This subsidi-
ary  issue  is  particularly  relevant  to  the  legal  basis  for  international
human rights litigation in U.S.  courts.  The famous Filartiga decision
held that the CIL of human rights could be applied by courts even in
the absence  of any political  branch authorization.  As we  emphasized
in our earlier work, however,  the requirement  of political  branch  au-
thorization  "would  not  necessarily  spell  the  end  for  Filartiga-type"
human  rights litigation.2"  This  is so,  we  explained,  because  the  au-
thorization  requirement  might  be  satisfied by  the  Alien  Tort Statute
("ATS"),  or because  Congress  might incorporate portions of interna-
tional human rights law  into federal law, as  it did with respect to tor-
ture  and  extrajudicial  killing in the Torture Victim Protection  Act  of
1991  ("TVPA"). 2 0 1
These  arguments,  if persuasive,  are consistent  with our  thesis  that
CIL must be grounded in enacted federal law.  We analyze these argu-
ments  in  three steps.  We  first  explain  why rejection  of  the  modern
position threatens Filartiga-type  human rights litigation.  We then ex-
amine whether the ATS  authorizes courts to treat  CIL as federal law
in  human  rights cases.  Finally,  we  consider  the extent  to which  the
TVPA  does  so.  We  conclude  that there  is little  reason  to think that
Congress has federalized international human rights law outside of the
TVPA's specific prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killing.  Con-
gress  of  course  retains  the  prerogative  to  federalize  other  human
rights norms if it wishes.
A.  The Problem
The watershed  Filartiga decision exemplified  a  litigation  structure
that  would  become  typical  of  its  progeny.2°  In  that  case,  aliens
brought suit in federal court to recover civil damages for acts commit-
199.  See Bradley & Goldsmith,  supra note 1, at  869,  871-73.
200.  Id. at  872.
201.  See id. at  872-73.
202.  Professor Koh has described Filartiga  as the "Brown v. Board of Education" of
"transnational public law litigation." Koh, supra  note 102, at 2366.  The Filartiga  opin-
ion  describes  itself  as  "a  small but  important  step  in  the  fulfillment  of the  ageless
dream to free  all people  from brutal  violence."  Filartiga  v. Pena-Irala,  630  F.2d 876,
890 (2d  Cir. 1980).  The opinion's author, Judge  Kaufman,  later wrote  that the  deci-
sion was  "the  latest development  in  an  unprecedented  growth  of international  con-
cern  over  the  incidence  of  torture  and  other  human-rights  violations,"  and  he
observed that "[t]he  enunciation of humane norms of behavior by the global commu-
nity and the articulation of evolved norms of international law by the courts form the
ethical foundations for a more enlightened social order."  Irving R. Kaufman, A Legal
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ted abroad by another alien  in alleged violation  of customary interna-
tional  human rights  law.  The statutory  basis  for federal jurisdiction
was the ATS, which provides that "[t]he  district courts shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction of any civil action  by an alien  for a tort only, commit-
ted  in  violation  of  the  law  of  nations  or  a  treaty  of  the  United
States." 3  But the necessary Article III  basis for the exercise of fed-
eral judicial  power  was  uncertain.  The  parties  to the  suit  were  not
diverse, and the court did not assume that the case arose under either
a treaty or federal statute.2 4  The court concluded  that these circum-
stances  were  not fatal  to jurisdiction,  however,  because  Article  III's
"arising under" clause is also satisfied by cases that arise under federal
common  law.205  Asserting  that  "the  law  of nations  . . . has  always
been part of the federal  common  law,"  the court held that the  plain-
tiffs'  CIL claim arose under federal  law for purposes of Article III.2"6
The court in Filartiga  thus assumed  that the ATS  was a pure juris-
dictional  statute that  did not itself  incorporate  CIL into federal  law
and whose constitutionality  in cases between  aliens depended  on the
existence of an independently-derived  federal  common law of interna-
tional human rights law.207  If this reading of the ATS is correct, then a
rejection  of the  view that  CIL is  automatically  federal  common  law
would appear to render human rights litigation under  the ATS  in Fi-
lartiga-type cases  inconsistent  with  Article  III  and  thus  unconstitu-
tional.2°8  It does not follow, however, that human  rights  litigation is
necessarily illegitimate, since  it is possible that the ATS is more  than
just a jurisdictional statute, or that the TVPA  now provides  sufficient
authorization for the Filartiga  holding.
B.  The ATS
There are basically  two ways  to interpret  the ATS to authorize  the
federalization of international  human rights law.2- 39  The  first interpre-
Remedy for International Torture?, The New York Times, Sec. 6, p.44, clm. 1 (Nov. 9,
1980).
203.  28 U.S.C. § 1350.  The statute  was part of the Judiciary Act  of 1789,  § 9(b),  1
Stat. 73, 77.  Between 1789 and 1980, courts had upheld jurisdiction under the ATS  in
only two cases. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857,  863-65 (D. Md.  1961); Bolchos v.
Darrel, 3 Cas.  810,  810  (D.S.C. 1795)  (No.  1,607).  Since  Filartiga.  numerous  courts
have upheld ATS jurisdiction.
204. See Filartiga,  630 F.2d  at 887.
205.  See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406  U.S. 91,  99-100 (1972).
206.  Filartiga,  630 F.2d at 885.
207.  See id. at 887  (construing ATS "not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply
as opening the federal courts  for adjudication of the rights already recognized  by  in-
ternational  law").
208.  See Anne-Marie  Burley, The Alien  Tort Statute and the Judiciary  Act of 1789:
A  Badge of Honor,  83 Am. J. Int'l L. 461, 468 (1989)  [hereinafter  Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute].
209.  A third way is to view the ATS in  alien-alien cases as an example  of "protec-
tive jurisdiction." See Russell J. Weintraub, Establishing  Incredible  Events by Credible
Evidence:  Civil Suits for Atrocities that Violate International  Law, 62 Brook.  L  Rev.
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tation would  be that the  ATS itself establishes  a substantive  federal
cause  of action  for violations  of CIL.  This would  mean that  a claim
brought  pursuant  to  the  ATS  would  "arise  under"  the  ATS  rather
than,  as Filartiga  concluded,  under  the federal  common  law  of CIL.
Several  courts have  read  the ATS to create  a cause  of action  in  this
fashion,  although they  have  not tied  this holding  to the issue  of the
ATS's constitutionality  under Article  Ill.21
The second  interpretation  views the ATS's jurisdictional grant not
to create  a cause of action itself, but rather to authorize federal courts
to do so.  On this view, ATS  cases would arise under this congressio-
nally-authorized  federal common law for purposes  of Article III.  The
obvious  analogy  here  is  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  in  Lincoln
Mills,  which  implied  federal  common  lawmaking  powers  from  the
Taft-Hartley  Act's  grant  of  federal  jurisdiction  to  decide  disputes
under  certain  labor-management  contracts. 2 I  At  least  one  federal
court, citing Lincoln Mills, appears to have adopted this reading of the
ATS.212
Can the ATS plausibly be read to convert CIL into substantive  fed-
eral law under either of these interpretations?  As Professor Slaughter
(formerly  Burley)  has  correctly  noted,  "definitive  proof  of  the  in-
tended  purpose  and  scope of the  [ATS]  is  impossible. '213  Nonethe-
less, the ATS's text, drafting history, and historical context may render
some  constructions  of  the  statute  more  plausible  than  others.
Although these sources do not provide a complete picture of what the
ATS was designed to do, they do provide powerful reasons to rule out
both the federal cause of action and Lincoln Mills interpretations  out-
lined  above.
The ATS was enacted by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.  Its original language provided  that federal district courts
"shall  also have  cognizance ...  of all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in  violation of the law  of nations or  a treaty of the  United
States." ' 4  As Professor Casto has noted, "cognizance"  was a term of
753  (1996).  The theory  of protective jurisdiction, which  has never  been accepted  by
the Supreme Court, would allow Congress to create federal court jurisdiction for non-
federal claims where "necessary to protect important federal interests." Chemerinsky,
supra note  110, § 5.2.2,  at 260.  Goodman and  Jinks dismiss protective jurisdiction  as
an implausible rationale for international  human rights litigation under the ATS.  See
Goodman  & Jinks, supra note  5,  at 478-79  n.89.  We  tend  to agree.  See Bradley  &
Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 873  n.354.
210.  See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1474-75  (9th Cir. 1993);  Xuncax v. Gramajo,  886 F. Supp.  162,  179  (D. Mass.  1995).
211.  See Textile  Workers  Union v. Lincoln  Mills,  353  U.S.  448, 456-57  (1957).
212.  Abebe-Jira  v. Negewo,  72 F.3d 844,  848  (11 th Cir. 1996).
213.  Burley,  The Alien Tort Statute, supra note  208, at 463; see also IT  v.  Vencap,
Ltd.,  519  F.2d  1001,  1015  (2d  Cir.  1975)  (The  ATS  "is  a  kind  of  legal  Lohengrin;
although it has been  with us since  the  first Judiciary  Act ...  no one  seems to know
whence it came.").
214.  Judiciary  Act of 1789,  ch. 20,  § 9(b),  1 Stat. 73.
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art  "referring  to  a  court's power  to try  a case." 25  Casto  also  notes
that the First Congress used "entirely different language"  when it cre-
ated statutory civil actions.2 1 6  This jurisdictional reading of the ATS is
confirmed  by the  current  codification  of the  statute,  which  extends
"original jurisdiction"  over certain cases brought by aliens. 217  In sum,
the  language  of  the  ATS  makes  it  highly  unlikely  that  the  drafters
envisioned it as  creating federal substantive  rights.
It is  equally  unlikely that  the  drafters of the  ATS  envisioned  the
statute as authorizing Lincoln Mills-type federal common  law making.
The First  Congress  lacked  our  positivist  and  realist  conceptions  of
common law.218  In ATS  cases, as in other contexts, they  would have
envisioned federal  courts as applying  a pre-existing, non-federal  gen-
eral common law, which included the law of nations.2 11 In this milieu,
congressional authorization of Lincoln Mills-type federal common  law
was unnecessary  and, indeed, probably unthinkable. 2 -'0
There is thus little reason to think that the ATS as originally written
incorporated  CIL into federal  law  under  either the  federal cause  of
action or the Lincoln Mills theory.  An additional,  independent  diffi-
culty with viewing the ATS  as a basis for modern human rights  litiga-
tion concerns the dramatic differences  between  CIL when the statute
was written and  as understood today.  In  1789, the law of nations  did
not purport to regulate the treatment  of individuals by their own gov-
ernments.  As Professor  Slaughter  correctly  notes,  "18th-century  in-
ternational  lawyers  simply  could  not  have  imagined  that  the  law  of
nations would impose a positive obligation  on a government  with re-
spect to its own citizens." 1  The principal  individual  offenses against
the law of nations at the time the ATS was enacted were  violations of
safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.'
Modern  human rights litigation under the ATS, by contrast, primarily
concerns  the way a foreign nation treats its citizens.  In this light, the
pertinent question is the level  of generality  at which  the ATS  should
be  interpreted:  Does it authorize  civil suits  for law of nations  viola-
tions in general,  without regard to the changing content  of the law  of
215.  Casto, supra note 156,  at 479.
216.  See id.
217.  28 U.S.C.  § 1350.
218.  See Jay,  The Origins, supra note 24,  at  1309-10.
219.  See Casto, supra  note  156, at 480; William S.  Dodge, The Historical  Origins  of
the Alien  Tort Statute:  A  Response to the  "Originalists," 19  Hastings  Int'l  Comp. L
Rev. 221, 232-34  (1996); Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations, supra note  11,  at 822-
23.
220.  See Dodge, supra  note 219, at 234,  240.
221.  Burley, The Alien  Tort Statute, supra note 208, at  479 n.83.
222.  See 4 William  Blackstone, Commentaries  68 (1783).
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nations,  or  does  it  authorize  civil  suits  for  what  was  understood  in
1789 to be  the sorts of things regulated  by the law  of nations?223
Many  federal  courts have interpreted  the ATS  as  authorizing  suits
for  violations  of the  new  CIL that  has  developed  since  World  War
II.224  This  view of the ATS  "creates  a great  potential  for expanding
the reach  of international law  in U.S. courts. '225  Three factors, how-
ever,  cut against  this reading.  First, Erie's repudiation  of the general
common  law  background  against which  the ATS  was  enacted  means
that the progressive reading  of the ATS would not only extend juris-
diction to completely different types of international law claims, but it
would  also read  the  ATS,  in contrast  to its  original  design,  to  apply
this new CIL of human rights as federal law.  As a result, the progres-
sive  reading  of the  ATS has potentially  profound  collateral  implica-
tions  for  state  law,  federal  question  jurisdiction,  and  possibly  the
legality of presidential actions that go far beyond anything that could
have been contemplated  by the First Congress.
Second, there  is general agreement that a significant purpose of the
ATS  was to  ensure  that the  United  States  complied  with  its obliga-
tions under  international  law  by providing  redress  for  certain  viola-
tions of the law  of nations.  More specifically,  a major impetus for the
ATS  was  unredressed  attacks  on  ambassadors  in  the  United  States
during the Articles  of Confederation  period  that implicated  the U.S.
responsibility under international  law.226  In this light, it appears  that
the ATS was  designed  to give  foreign governmental  officials the pro-
tection of CIL as part of a larger effort  by the United States  to avoid
foreign relations controversies.  This original purpose of the ATS con-
trasts sharply  with its modern  usage.  The United  States has no gen-
eral duty under international law to provide civil remedies in its courts
for human rights violations committed  abroad by foreign government
officials against aliens.227  Moreover, the modern ATS uses CIL not as
223.  One could  accept the idea that  the drafters  meant to allow for changes  in  the
specific  content  of the  law of nations, without  accepting the idea  that the  ATS  was
intended to cover the structurally  very different  new CIL.  As Judge  Bork observed:
It  is  one thing for a  case  like  The Paquete Habana to  find  that  a rule  has
evolved  so that the  United  States  may not seize  coastal  fishing boats  of a
nation with which we are at war.  It is another thing entirely, a difference  in
degree  so  enormous  as to  be  a  difference  in  kind, to  find  that  a  rule  has
evolved  against  torture  by government  so that our courts must  sit in judg-
ment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own countries with respect to
their own  citizens.
Tel-Oren  v.  Libyan  Arab  Republic,  726  F.2d  774,  813  (D.C.  Cir.  1984)  (Bork,  J.,
concurring).
224.  See, e.g.,  Kadic v. Karadzic,  70 F.3d  232, 238  (2d  Cir. 1995); Filartiga  v.  Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d  876,  881  (2d  Cir. 1980).
225.  Stephens & Ratner, International  Human Rights Litigation, supra  note  156, at
53.
226.  See  Casto, supra note  156,  at 489-94; Dodge, supra note 219,  at 226-30.
227.  As Professor Slaughter has noted,  "[s]trictly  speaking, the duty of the  United
States  at  international  law  extends  no  further  than  to  refrain  from  violating  the
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a shield to protect  foreign governmental  officials from  torts commit-
ted in  the United States,  but  rather as  a sword  to  hold  them  civilly
liable for tortious acts that took place abroad.  And, whatever else the
ATS may accomplish, it does not, in most instances  anyway, promote
amicable  inter-national  relations.
The third  difference  concerns  the  extraterritorial  use  of  the ATS.
Recall that under current  practice,  federal  courts  exercising jurisdic-
tion under the ATS  create  causes of action and  remedies  as a matter
of United States federal  law to govern the activities of foreign govern-
ment  officials on foreign  soil.  Such extraterritorial  regulation  would
have been  unthinkable  in  the  eighteenth  century,  a  time  when  each
nation's regulatory power was limited to conduct either within the na-
tion's  territory  or by  the  nation's  citizens.'  The  specific  historical
context in which the ATS  was enacted  further suggests  that  its scope
was limited to acts that took place in or at least had some nexus to the
United States.  As Judge Edwards explained in Tel-Oren, "the  focus of
attention  . . . was  on  actions  occurring  within  the  territory  of  the
United States,  or  perpetrated  by  a  U.S.  citizen,  against  an  alien." '' 9
Modem ATS cases, by contrast, involve the application of U.S.  causes
of  action  and  remedies  to  extraterritorial  acts  that  have  no  nexus
whatsoever  to  the  United  States.  This  broad  extraterritorial  scope
would have  been  inconceivable  in  1789.-0°  It also  runs  afoul  of the
human rights of its own  citizens."  Burley,  The Alien  Tort Statute, supra note 208,  at
492.
228.  See Born, supra note 97,  at 493-97,  549-50.
229.  Tel-Oren  v. Libyan  Arab  Republic,  726  F.2d 774,  783  (D.C.  Cir.  1984)  (Ed-
wards J., concurring).
230.  Consistent with prevailing notions of territorialism, Oliver Ellsworth, the prin-
cipal drafter of the ATS,  believed  "that  the United  States lacked  legislative jurisdic-
tion  over  transactions  in  foreign  countries."  Casto, supra note  156,  at  485-86  n.97
(citing Letter  from  Chief Justice  Ellsworth  to Jonathan  Trumbull  (March  13,  1796)
(George Washington Papers,  Library of Congress)).  Some commentators  and judges
claim that  extraterritorial jurisdiction  was  recognized  in  1789  for certain  egregious
violations  of international  law, pursuant  to  the  international  law  doctrine  of hostis
humani generis. See, e.g., Jeffrey M.  Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal  Jurisdiction
over International  Hunan Rights Clains: The Alien Tort Clains Act after Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 22 Harv. J. Int'l L. 53,  60-62 (1981);  Tel-Oren, 726  F.2d at 781  (Edwards,
J., concurring).  No ATS case before  1980  considered  the  doctrine of hostis humanis
generis, but some nineteenth  century  courts did  apply the  doctrine to  the acts of pi-
rates and, in some instances, slave traders.  The scope of this doctrine was  uncertain.
In United States v. Palmer,  16 U.S.  (3  Wheat.)  610 (1818).  the  Court construed  a  fed-
eral piracy statute, which on its face extended to "any person" who committed  piracy
on  the high  seas,  not  to  apply  to  persons  "who  [were]  not  citizens  of the  United
States, nor sailing  under  their  flag,  nor offending  particularly  against  them."  Id. at
630-35.  In  United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5  Wheat.)  144,  151-52 (1820),  the Court
applied the same statute to piracy on the high seas committed by a  U.S. citizen,  while
suggesting that no jurisdictional nexus with the United States was necessary  when the
pirate  "acknowledg[ed]  obedience  to  no  government  whatever."  Even  there,  the
Court made  clear  that the statute  did  not  apply  to  extraterritorial  acts  of persons
"under the acknowledged  authority  of a foreign [s]tate"  committed  against non-U.S.
citizens. Id. at 152; see also United States  v. Furlong,  18  U.S.  (5  Wheat.)  184,  192-96FORDHAM LAW  REVIEW
reinvigorated  presumption in U.S.  law  against the extraterritorial  ap-
plication  of federal  statutes. 2 3'  This presumption  is designed  at least
in part to ensure that the political  branches  rather than  courts make
decisions  about  extraterritorial  scope  that might  adversely  implicate
U.S.  foreign relations  interests. 2 32  In recent years,  the Court  has in-
voked the presumption in numerous contexts to limit the extraterrito-
rial  scope  of  statutes  that  contain  far  stronger  suggestions  of
extraterritorial  intent  than  the  ATS.r 3  It makes  particular  sense  to
apply  this presumption  in the  context  of the ATS-a  statute  that  is
(1820)  (reaffirming  that the same statute extends to piracy  on the high seas by a crew
"whose  conduct is such as to set at nought the idea of ...  acting under allegiance  to
any [foreign]  power,"  while at the same time making clear that a murder on the high
seas  by one  non-citizen  against  another  did  not  fall  within  the  statute).  Whatever
status the nineteenth century doctrine of hostis humani generis may have as a precur-
sor to modem international  human rights law and  universal jurisdiction, it cannot  be
invoked as a basis to construe  the original understanding of the ATS to extend to the
acts  of a foreign  sovereign  and  its agents  committed  on foreign  soil  in  violation  of
CIL.  In  addition  to  all  of the  independent  evidence  that  the  ATS  had  a  different
scope,  the notion of applying  CIL to  acts on  foreign  soil under color  of law  would
have been unthinkable.  Consider what Justice Story, a judge otherwise  supportive of
natural  law  claims  and  broad  judicial  power,  said  during  this  period  in  a  related
context:
No one [nation] has a right to sit in judgment generally upon  the actions of
another; at least to the extent of compelling  its adherence  to all the  princi-
ples of justice and  humanity  in  its  domestic concerns.  If a  nation  were  to
violate as to its own subjects in its domestic regulation the clearest principles
of public law,  I do not know, that  that law  has ever held  them amenable  to
the tribunals of other nations for such conduct.  It would be inconsistent with
the equality  and  sovereignty of nations,  which  admit  no common  superior.
No  nation  has  ever  yet  pretended  to  be  the  custos  morum  of the  whole
world; and though abstractedly a particular regulation may violate the law of
nations,  it  may  sometimes,  in  the  case  of nations,  be  a  wrong  without  a
remedy.
United  States v. La Juene Eugenie,  26 F. Cas.  832,  847  (D. Mass.  1822).
231.  See Sale  v. Haitian  Ctrs. Council,  Inc.,  509  U.S.  155,  173-74  (1993);  Smith  v.
United States, 507  U.S. 197, 204 (1993);  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248  (1991);  Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping  Corp., 488 U.S. 428,  440-
41  (1989).
232.  See Bradley,  Territorial  Intellectual  Property Rights, supra note  112, at  140-53.
233.  The extraterritoriality  decision  with the  closest connection  to the  ATS  is Ar-
gentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S.  428 (1989).  At issue there was the extra-
territorial  scope  of the Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act  (FSIA), which  establishes
the grounds for jurisdiction in suits against foreign sovereigns.  After holding that the
ATS could  not  be  a  basis for federal jurisdiction  against  foreign sovereigns  because
the FSIA  was the  exclusive basis for such suits, id. at 433-38, the Court turned to the
scope of jurisdiction  under the FSIA.  Despite  ambiguous  statutory  definitions  sug-
gesting that  FSIA jurisdiction  might extend  to  a tort by  a  foreign sovereign  on the
high seas,  the Court applied  the presumption to hold that the FSIA did not extend  so
far. See id. at 440 (invoking "[tihe  canon of construction which teaches  that legislation
of Congress, unless contrary intent appears, is meant  to apply only within  the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States"  (citation omitted));  id. ("When  it desires to do
so, Congress knows how to place  the high  seas within  the jurisdictional  reach  of the
statute.").  This  logic applies  with  even greater  force  to the  ATS, which  contains no
hint of extraterritorial  scope, and  which, unlike  the FSIA, was  drafted in  a  milieu in
which  rigid  territorialism was  much  more pervasive.
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silent about its extraterritorial scope, that lay largely fallow  for nearly
200  years,  and  that,  in contrast  to  anything  imaginable  when  it  was
enacted, is being invoked as a vehicle to regulate the way  that foreign
governments  treat foreign  citizens  on foreign  soil.
In  sum,  dramatically  changed  circumstances  between  1789  and
1980,  when  combined  with  (a)  the  ATS's  textual  suggestion  that  it
concerns only jurisdiction,  (b) the implausibility of a cause of action or
Lincoln Mills interpretation of the ATS as an original matter, and (c)
the fact that the ATS lay practically dormant for nearly 200 years, lead
us to the conclusion that the ATS cannot support the modem practice.
C.  The  TVPA
Goodman and Jinks argue that, regardless of the best reading of the
ATS  or of the original validity  of Filartiga,  the TVPA  provides "spe-
cific  evidence  of  congressional  authorization  of  the  Filartiga doc-
trine."'   Unfortunately  for  their  argument,  this  specific  evidence
consists almost exclusively of snippets of legislative history-language
in  House  and  Senate  Reports,  and  statements  by  the  Act's  spon-
sors.3 5  Moreover, this legislative history is more  ambiguous about  its
approval of Filartiga  than Goodman and Jinks suggest.  And, most im-
portantly, to the extent  that the legislative  history did approve  of Fi-
lartiga,  this approval  is  inconsistent  wvith  actual federal  enactments-
including  the TVPA itself-that indicate  that  Congress  rejects Filar-
tiga's open-ended  incorporation  of CIL  into federal  law.
As  Goodman  and  Jinks  suggest,  a  proximate  cause  of  the  TVPA
was Judge Bork's opinion in  Tel-Oren.36 In  Tel-Oren, aliens accused
Libya, the PLO,  and  others  of violating CIL prohibitions  on torture
and summary execution  in connection  with  an armed attack  in Israel
in 1978.  Bork's opinion rejected  the Filartiga  framework  and argued
instead that jurisdiction under the ATS  depended on the existence of
a cause of action under a federal statute, treaty, or CIL.  He found no
such cause of action under any of these  sources.  Moreover, in order
"to avoid potential interference with the political branches' conduct of
foreign relations,"  he declined to infer one. --"  Instead, he argued, the
court should  wait for "affirmative  action  by  Congress"  before  apply-
234.  Goodman & Jinks, supra note  5.  at 514.
235.  They also cite to amicus curiae briefs written  by law professors. See ul.,  supra
note  5,  at 527.
236.  Tel-Oren  v. Libyan  Arab Republic, 726  F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984)  (Bork,
J., concurring).  There  was no opinion of the court  in  Tel-Oren. All  three judges on
the D.C. Circuit panel rejected the plaintiffs'  claim under the ATS, albeit for different
reasons. See iL at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring): id. at 823 (Robb,  J., concurring).  But
Judge Bork's opinion received  the most notoriety. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato.  What
Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously
Mistaken, 79  Am. J. Int'l L. 92  (1985).
237.  Tel-Oren, 726  F.2d at  799.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ing the 1789 ATS to modern human rights litigation  that the drafters
of the Act could not have contemplated.
2 38
Congress  provided  this  affirmative  action  in the TVPA. 2 39  But far
from ratifying  the wholesale  incorporation  of CIL assumed  by Filar-
tiga, it created  a  federal  cause  of action  only for  torture  and  extra-
238.  Id. at 801  (quoting Bivens  v. Six Unknown  Named Agents  of Fed. Bureau  of
Narcotics,  403  U.S.  388,  396 (1971));  see  also id. at  801-05.
239.  The Torture Victim Protection Act of  1991  in its entirety  provides:
Section  1. Short  Title
This Act may be cited  as the "Torture  Victim Protection  Act of 1991."
Section 2. Establishment  of Civil  Action
(a)  Liability.-An  individual  who,  under  actual  or  apparent  authority,  or
color of law, of any foreign nation-
(1)  subjects an individual to torture  shall, in  a civil action, be  liable for
damages  to that individual;  or
(2)  subjects  an individual  to extrajudicial killing shall,  in  a civil action,
be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any
person  who  may be a claimant  in an  action for wrongful  death.
(b) Exhaustion  of Remedies.-A court  shall  decline  to  hear a  claim  under
this section  if the claimant  has not exhausted adequate  and  available  reme-
dies  in the place  in  which the conduct giving rise to the claim  occurred.
(c) Statute of Limitations.-No action shall be maintained under the provi-
sions of this section unless it is commenced  within 10 years of the time after
the  cause  of action  arose.
Section  3.  Definitions
(a) Extrajudicial Killing.-For the purposes of this Act, the term "extrajudi-
cial  killing"  means a  deliberated  killing not authorized  by  a previous judg-
ment  pronounced  by  a  regularly constituted  court  affording  all the judicial
guarantees which are  recognized  as indispensable  by civilized  peoples.  Such
term,  however, does  not  include  any  such  killing  that,  under international
law,  is lawfully  carried out  under the authority  of a foreign nation.
(b) Torture.-For  the purposes  of this Act-
(1) the term  "torture" means  any act, directed  against an  individual  in
the offender's custody  or physical control,  by which severe pain or suf-
fering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent  in, or
incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intention-
ally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information  or a confession,  punishing that
individual for an act that individual or a third person  has committed or
is suspected of having committed, intimidating  or coercing that individ-
ual or a third person, or for any reason based  on a discrimination of any
kind; and
(2)  mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by
or resulting  from-
(A)  the  intentional  infliction  or  threatened  infliction  of  severe
physical pain  or suffering;
(B)  the administration  or application,  or threatened administration
or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures cal-
culated  to disrupt profoundly  the senses  or the personality;
(C) the threat  of imminent death;  or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances  or other procedures  calcu-
lated to disrupt  profoundly  the  senses or personality.
Torture Victim  Protection Act of 1991,  Pub. L. No.  102-25,  106 Stat.  73  (1992).
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judicial killing.240  Consistent with  this textual  limitation,  the  House
and Senate Reports both emphasize  the high  degree  of international
consensus  concerning  the illegality of torture and extrajudicial killing,
and they both state that "[t]he purpose of [the TVPA]  is to provide a
Federal  cause  of action  against  any individual  who,  under actual  or
apparent  authority or under color  of any foreign  nation, subjects  any
individual to torture or extrajudicial  killing." 24'
The TVPA's relatively narrow incorporation of international human
rights law  into federal  law differs from the Filartiga  approach  in sev-
eral  respects.  It  limits  the  scope  of  the  federal  prohibition  to  acts
done under color of foreign law.242  It defines the new federal causes
of action  with  a careful  precision  that contrasts  with  the  vague  con-
tours of analogous  CIL  prohibitions.2 43  It includes  an exhaustion re-
quirement  that was  designed  to avoid  unnecessary  interference  with
foreign nations and undue burden on U.S.  courts  . 2"  And it provides a
statute  of limitations  designed  to  avoid  stale  claims.2 4 5  In  these  re-
spects  and  others, the TVPA  serves  precisely  the  purpose  sought  by
Bork's opinion.  It establishes  a democratic  foundation  for the  appli-
cation by U.S.  courts of international  law prohibitions on torture  and
extrajudicial killing; it rectifies  many of the substantive ambiguities of
the Filartiga  approach  to these international  law prohibitions;  and  it
adds substantive  and procedural  limitations that  balance  the  need  to
promote two human rights norms with the countervailing concerns  of
foreign relations and the burdened  federal judiciary. 46
240.  28 U.S.C.  § 1350 note,  §§  2(a), 3.
241.  S. Rep. No.  102-249,  at 3 (1991)  (emphasis added),  H.  Rep. No.  102-367,  at 2
(1991)  (emphasis added).
242.  28 U.S.C.  § 1350 note, § 2(a).  Also  unlike  the Filartiga  approach.  the TVPA
permits U.S.  citizens to sue  for recovery. Id.
243.  The TVPA's definitions of torture and extrajudicial  killing  are narrower  than
those definitions under CIL  and the Torture  Convention.  They  track  the definitions
adopted  by the Senate's  Understanding of the requirements of the Torture Conven-
tion, which was a condition  to the  Senate's consent  to  ratification of the  treaty.
244.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(b); see also H. Rep. No. 102-367,  at 87 (1991)  (stat-
ing that the exhaustion  requirement  "ensures  that  U.S.  courts  will not  intrude  into
cases more appropriately  handled  by courts  where the  alleged  torture  or killing oc-
curred"  and avoids "exposing  U.S.  courts  to unnecessary  burdens").
245.  28 U.S.C.  § 1350 note, § 2(c); see also H.  Rep. No.  102-367,  at 88  (1991)  (the
statute of limitations  requirement  "ensures  that  the  federal  courts  will  not have  to
hear stale claims").
246.  Despite  these limitations,  President  Bush  expressed  the  following  concerns
upon signing the  legislation:
This legislation  concerns acts of torture and  extrajudicial  killing committed
overseas by  foreign  individuals.  With rare  exceptions,  the  victims of these
acts will  be foreign  citizens.  There  is  thus  a  danger  that  U.S.  courts  may
become embroiled  in difficult and  sensitive disputes in other countries,  and
possibly ill-founded or politically motivated suits, which  have  nothing to do
with the United States and which offer little prospect of successful recovery.
Such potential abuse of this statute undoubtedly would  give rise to serious
frictions in  international  relations  and  would  also  be  a waste  of our  own
limited and  already  overburdened judicial resources.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
On its  face,  the TVPA  appears  to reject  rather  than  embrace  the
open-ended  Filartiga approach  to  the judicial  incorporation  of  CIL
into federal law.  The TVPA's text does not remotely  suggest  an im-
plicit  embrace  of the  Filartiga approach.  If Congress  had  chosen  to
federalize all  CIL  human rights prohibitions, it would have needed  to
enact a significantly different, and broader, statute.  Instead, in its first
consideration since  1789 of the meaning and  scope  of the ATS,  Con-
gress in the TVPA federalized  only prohibitions on torture and extra-
judicial  killing.  Moreover,  the  TVPA  appears  in  fact  to  limit the
Filartiga  approach with respect to these two central  and important in-
ternational law prohibitions.  Otherwise, one  could bring torture  and
extrajudicial  killing  claims  under  the  Filartiga rationale  without  the
need to satisfy the TVPA's definitional, statute of limitations,  and ex-
haustion requirements, thereby rendering the TVPA's careful substan-
tive and  procedural  compromises  a nullity.  In this light, it makes no
sense whatsoever to read the TVPA  as implicitly federalizing,  without
procedural  or substantive  limitation,  other  CIL human  rights  norms,
most of which  are much less settled  and central  than torture  and ex-
trajudicial  killing.
This conclusion  that the TVPA federalizes  only two and  not a host
of CIL norms  is confirmed  by other political  branch enactments  both
before  and  after  the TVPA.  These  enactments  indicate,  contrary  to
Filartiga's  wholesale  incorporation  of CIL into federal  law,  that  the
political branches  are very  stingy and  selective in  their incorporation
of international  human rights norms into domestic federal  law.  Con-
sider, for example, the Torture  Convention.247  The Senate consented
to ratification  of the Convention in October, 1990, in the midst of de-
liberation  about  the TVPA  but  18  months  before its  enactment.  At
the recommendation  of President Bush, the Senate attached  a number
of conditions  to its consent  that reveal  an unambiguous  desire  to en-
sure that  the Convention  has no effect on contrary  domestic  law ab-
sent  subsequent  federal  legislation. 248  When  Congress  enacted  this
subsequent legislation in the TVPA, it adopted the Senate's definition
of torture  and  extrajudicial  killing, which  were narrower than CIL.
Statement by President George  Bush Upon Signing  H.R. 2092, 28 Weekly  Compila-
tion  of Presidential Documents  465,  March  16,  1992, reprinted in  1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
91.
247.  Convention  Against Torture  and  Other  Cruel, Inhuman  or Degrading  Treat-
ment or Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. 100-20  (1988),  23 I.L.M.  1027 (1984),  as modified,
24 I.L.M.  535  (1985).
248.  Most significantly,  the Senate  insisted  that  the substantive provisions  of  the
Torture Convention,  Articles  1-16, were "not self-executing."  See Committee on For-
eign Relations, Convention Against Torture and  Other Cruel,  Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,  S. Exec. Rep. No.  101-30, at 31.  This means that  the Tor-
ture Convention does not apply  as domestic federal law in the absence  of implement-
ing  legislation  by  Congress.  The  Senate  also  imposed  various  reservations  and
understandings  that together  ensure that  the Convention  does  not trump  otherwise
inconsistent  federal and  state law. See id. at 29-30.
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The Torture Convention and the TVPA reflect a broader and unam-
biguous pattern of political branch  resistance to open-ended  incorpo-
ration of international human rights  norms that  might  interfere  with
domestic  state  and  federal  law.  The  numerous  reservations,  under-
standings,  and declarations  attached to the Torture Convention  were
replicated  in the Senate's consent  to the Convention  on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms  of Discrimination,  and the  Covenant  on  Civil and
Political  Rights. 249  The same  pattern can  be seen  in  statutes  that se-
lectively  incorporate  international  human  rights  norms  into  federal
law.  The 1987  Genocide  Convention  Implementation  Act, for exam-
ple, made genocide a federal crime. 5 0  It carefully  limited this crime,
however, to acts  committed  within the  United States  or  by  U.S.  na-
tionals, and it specified that the federal crime did not preclude "appli-
cation  of  State  or  local  laws"  to  the  same  conduct  and  did  not
"creat[e]  any  substantive  or  procedural  right  enforceable  by  law  by
any party in any proceeding."251  None of these narrow, selective, and
carefully-defined  incorporations  of human rights  law into federal  law
make  any sense  if  Congress  in  the TVPA  had  actually  approved  of
Filartiga's  wholesale  incorporation  of the  CIL  of human  rights  into
federal law.
This  is  the background  against  which  the legislative  history of the
TVPA must be read.  This legislative history does approve of Filartiga
in  places.  But  even  this  approval  is  ambiguous.  It  does  not  make
clear, for example, whether it approves of Filartiga's  wholesale incor-
poration of CIL into federal law, which would bind the states and per-
haps  the  President,  or  rather  whether  it  merely  approves  of  the
judicial incorporation  of the CIL of human rights as applied  to foreign
governmental  acts.  Nor does it say  anything about whether  the sub-
stantive and procedural limitations  of the TVPA  apply  to ATS cases.
Whatever  its  meaning, there  is  a  good  reason  why  this  approval  of
Filartiga  is in the legislative history rather than the text of the TVPA.
The TVPA was approved by Congress only after years of debate, com-
promise,  and precise  drafting that limited  the original  bill's scope  in
several respects. 2  It is extremely unlikely that the members of Con-
gress  who  demanded  these  changes  and  ultimately  voted  for  the
TVPA  would  have  assented  to  the  much  broader,  open-ended,  and
undefined Filartiga  approach, which includes many more CIL prohibi-
249. See Henkin,  U.S. Ratification, supra note  51, at 342-44.
250.  18 U.S.C.  §§ 1091-92  (Supp.  1997).
251.  Id,  §§ 1091(d),  1092.
252. The TVPA  was  first introduced  in  1986  and  finally enacted  in  1991.  During
this period,  the sponsors of the  bill  added  (among other  things) an  exhaustion  re-
quirement, a statute of limitations,  and  a narrower definition  of torture  in  order  to
accommodate the concerns  of numerous members  of Congress. See  138  Cong.  Rec.
S2667  (daily  ed.  March  3,  1992)  (statement  of Senator  Grassley);  137  Cong.  Rec.
S1378  (daily  ed.  Jan.  31, 1991)  (statement  of  Senator  Specter);  137  Cong.  Rec.
H11244-04  (daily ed. Nov. 25,  1991)  (statement of Congressman  Mazzoli).
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tions than  the  TVPA,  contains  no  procedural  limitations,  and  might
trump state law.  This fact, combined with the ambiguities in the legis-
lative history and the countervailing indications of other congressional
enactments,  suggests that the TVPA  should  not be  read as  implicitly
ratifying Filartiga.
At the end of the day, the weight to be given to the TVPA's legisla-
tive  history  will  depend  on  one's  view  regarding  the  appropriate
sources of statutory interpretation.  We  have tried to present reasons
why  even someone  who thinks  that legislative  history is  a significant
source of statutory meaning might not view this aspect of the TVPA's
legislative  history  as  reflecting  federal  law.  If  Congress  really  does
support the Filartiga  logic as strongly  as  Goodman and Jinks believe,
there is nothing to fear from a requirement  that Congress express this
approval in a statute rather than in ambiguous legislative history.  It is
much more likely, however, that Congress will continue to incorporate
CIL  on  a  very selective  basis  with  numerous  procedural  limitations
and  without preempting inconsistent  state  law.
CONCLUSION
Some  might  think  that  our  arguments  reflect  hostility  towards
human rights or international law.  This is not our view.  The growing
international recognition that a government cannot, under the guise of
sovereignty,  violate the basic individual rights of its citizens  is one of
the  most  positive  moral  and  legal  developments  in  the  post-World
War II period.  The human rights revolution does not exist, however,
in  a legal  vacuum on  the international  or the domestic  plane.  Legal
structures  can  reflect  the  human  rights  revolution  in  a  number  of
ways,  and  some  are more  effective  and  legitimate  than  others.  Do-
mestic  constitutionalism has been the primary vehicle  for recognition
and  enforcement  of human rights  in  this country.  European  nations
and  other  countries  have  begun  to achieve  similar  ends through  the
interaction  of  domestic  constitutionalism  and  international  organiza-
tions constituted  and governed  by treaty.
CIL presents a third legal mechanism for the recognition of interna-
tional human rights.  But the new CIL of human rights raises serious
questions  not  raised  by  other  methods  for  enforcing  international
human rights.  On the international plane, there is no clear conception
regarding  how  this new  CIL is  made or identified,  and  there  is even
more uncertainty regarding how it fits into the traditional structures of
international law.  This article has focused on the different question of
how the new CIL fits into the domestic constitutional structure of the
United  States.  CIL's  domestic legal  status has significance in  the en-
forcement  of human rights in this country, because  the federal polit-
ical  branches  have  largely  conditioned  ratification  of  international
human  rights  treaties  on  their  non-enforceability  as  domestic  law.
Our  prior work  argued  that the  modern  position  view that  the new
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CIL is automatically  incorporated  into federal  common  law is incon-
sistent  with  fundamental  constitutional  values.  In  this  Article,  we
have further argued  that, with minor exceptions,  current  federal  stat-
utes do not support incorporation of substantive rules of the new CIL
of human fights.
In  the  United  States,  international  law  has  long  suffered  from
doubts  of legitimacy-in  the  academy,  in  policy  circles,  and  in  the
popular mind.  One reason for these doubts is that international  law is
viewed  as  something  alien to our  political  and  legal  traditions.  An-
other reason is that international  lawyers often  confound  law and as-
piration.  We believe that the current structure of international  human
fights litigation in U.S.  courts only increases  these  doubts.  And this,
in  turn,  raises the  question  of whether  the  current  system  helps  or
hinders the ultimate enforceability of international  human rights law.
Our hope  is that  by highlighting the  difficulties  of the  modern  posi-
tion, we might  actually  contribute to placing international  law gener-
ally and international  human rights  law specifically  on a more  secure
constitutional  foundation.Notes &  Observations